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EU citizens and - through them - certain of their family members, derive from EU law the right to move 
between EU Member States and reside in the Member State of their choice. This right is enjoyed by all 
Union citizens irrespective of their sexual orientation. However, when rainbow families (i.e. families 
comprised of a same-sex couple and their child(ren)) exercise this right and move to a Member State 
which does not provide legal recognition to same-sex couples and/or their families, they are faced with 
the possibility that that Member State will refuse to legally recognise the familial ties among all or some 
members of the family, as these have been legally established elsewhere. This means that such families 
are not treated in the same way as the typical nuclear family which has an opposite-sex, married, couple 
with children as its basis: the familial links among the members of such families are only very rarely – if 
ever – legally contested. The question that emerges, therefore, is whether the severance in the host 
Member State of the legal ties among the members of rainbow families, amounts to a breach of EU law. 
This article will focus on the parent-child relationship and will examine the above question by taking a 
child-centred approach: does the refusal of the host Member State to legally recognise the relationship 
between a child and one or both of his same-sex parents when the family moves to its territory, amount 
to a breach of any of the rights that the child enjoys under EU law? 
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European Union (EU) citizens, 1  and – through them – (certain of) their family 
members, derive from EU law the right to move between EU Member States and 
reside in the Member State of their choice. This right is enjoyed by all Union citizens 
irrespective of their sexual orientation.2 However, when rainbow families (i.e. families 
comprised of a same-sex couple and their child(ren)3) move to a Member State which 
                                                 
*  Professor of Law, University of Reading. I am extremely grateful to Thérèse Callus, Loveday 
Hodson, Dimitry Kochenov, and Björn Sieverding, for their invaluable comments on an earlier 
draft of this article; needless to say, all errors remain mine. I would, also, like to thank the Law 
School, University of Reading, for the period of research leave it has generously granted me for 
writing this article.  
1  Article 20 TFEU provides that every person holding the nationality of an EU Member State is an 
EU citizen. 
2  As Jessurun D’Oliveira has aptly put it, ‘freedom of movement is granted in Article 3 EEC to 
persons (workers and others); lesbians and gay men are persons; thus lesbians and gay men 
enjoy freedom of movement’ – H. U. Jessurun d’Oliveira, ‘Lesbians and Gays and the Freedom 
of Movement of Persons’ in K. Waaldijk and A. Clapham (eds), Homosexuality: A European 
Community Issue (Martinus Nijhoff, 1993) 294. 
3  Rainbow families can, also, involve more complex parenting configurations, where the parental 
roles are divided among more than two persons (usually, among the two biological parents plus 
the partner of one or both and/or a best friend who donates a sperm or an egg). Due to lack of 
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does not provide legal recognition to same-sex couples and/or their families in its 
territory, they are faced with the possibility that that Member State will refuse to 
legally recognise the familial ties among all or some members of the family, as these 
have been legally established elsewhere. This means that such families are not treated 
in the same way as the typical nuclear family which has an opposite-sex, married, 
couple with its biologically-linked children as its basis: the familial links among the 
members of such families are only very rarely – if ever – legally contested. The 
question that emerges, therefore, is whether the refusal of some Member States to 
legally recognise the familial links among the members of rainbow families that move 
to their territory in exercise of EU free movement rights, amounts to a breach of EU 
law.  
 
Since the issue of the cross-border legal recognition of same-sex relationships in the 
EU context has been analysed in detail elsewhere,4 this article will merely concern the 
cross-border legal recognition of the parent-child relationship in rainbow families. This 
is an issue that, to date, has been mainly left untouched by legal commentators, as 
there has not been a single contribution which conclusively deals with this issue. This 
article, therefore, aims, exactly, to fill this gap in the literature. In addition, this article 
aims to provide a point of reference for all rainbow families that seek to enforce their 
right to free movement under EU law, as well as non-governmental organisations 
which have as their mission to protect the rights of such families.5 As will be explained 
in subsequent parts of this article, the non-recognition of the familial links among the 
members of rainbow families has a host of negative legal, practical, and psychological 
consequences for those families. It is, therefore, important to provide a clear analysis 
of why the severance of the legal ties among a child and one or both of his/her same-
sex parents in situations where the family has exercised EU free movement rights, 
amounts to a breach of EU law. 
 
The question of the cross-border legal recognition of the parent-child relationship in 
rainbow families can be examined from two different angles: the adults’ (parents’) 
angle (i.e. the position of the parents who are in a same-sex relationship) and the 
                                                 
space, this article shall, however, only consider the position of the more ‘traditional’ rainbow 
families, where the parental roles are played by two persons who comprise a same-sex couple. 
For an interesting analysis of the question of non-binary unions in EU Member States and under 
EU law see D. Kochenov and U. Belavusau, ‘Same-Sex Spouses: More Free Movement, but What 
about Marriage? The Romanian State, Sodom and Gomorrah, and the Case of Coman’ (2019) 56 
Common Market Law Review (forthcoming).  
4   See, inter alia, A. Tryfonidou, ‘EU Free Movement Law and the Legal Recognition of Same-Sex 
Relationships: The Case for Mutual Recognition’ (2015) 21 Columbia Journal of European Law 
195; U. Belavusau and D. Kochenov, ‘Federalizing Legal Opportunities for LGBT Movements in 
the Growing EU’ in K. Slootmaeckers, H. Touquet, and P. Vermeersch (eds), The EU Enlargement 
and Gay Politics: The Impact of Eastern Enlargement on Rights, Activism and Prejudice (Palgrave 
2016); D. Kochenov, ‘On Options of Citizens and Moral Choices of States: Gays and European 
Federalism’ (2009) 33 Fordham International Law Journal 156; K. Lenaerts, ‘Federalism and the 
Rule of Law’ (2011) 33 Fordham International Law Journal 1338, 1355-1361; S. Titshaw, ‘Same-
Sex Spouses Lost in Translation? How to Interpret “Spouse” in the EU Family Migration 
Directives’ (2016) 34 Boston University International Law Journal 45.   
5  In the European context, the Network of European LGBTIQ Families Associations (NELFA) has as 
its aim to advance the rights of rainbow families across Europe. 
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child’s angle (i.e. the position of the child whose relationship with one or both parents 
may not be legally recognised when the family moves to another Member State).6 A 
complete examination of both angles would, nonetheless, be worthy of a monograph 
in its own right. Accordingly, in this article I have chosen to examine the question 
solely from the perspective of the child, not least, for the practical reason that in all 
academic and other discussions conducted so far around this matter, this angle has 
been largely ignored. This is not surprising, as children’s voices tend to be too often 
absent in disputes involving the recognition of the parent-child relationship and 
human rights jurisprudence related to sexual orientation has mostly been moulded on 
the experiences of adults.7  
 
The article will begin by documenting, in section II, the situation with regards to 
parenting by same-sex couples in a single-country context: which EU Member States 
allow same-sex couples to become – and be recognised legally as – co-parents in their 
territory?  Section III will, then, proceed to examine briefly how children can benefit 
from family reunification and related rights granted by EU law in situations that 
involve the exercise of EU free movement rights, and Section IV will demonstrate the 
difficulties that rainbow families face when they move between EU Member States. 
Section V will then seek to explain why it is not permissible for EU Member States to 
refuse to recognise the familial links – as these have been established elsewhere – 
among the members of rainbow families that have moved to their territory. It will be 
seen that such a refusal amounts to, both, a breach of the EU free movement of 
persons provisions and of a number of fundamental human rights which are protected 
under EU law.  Accordingly, the main conclusion of the article will be that the legal 
tools that the EU already has at its disposal, namely, the free movement provisions 
and fundamental (human) rights, are sufficient for providing an appropriate solution 
to the problems faced by rainbow families when they exercise their free movement 
rights. What is needed, therefore, is for the EU to take a clear stance on the matter 
and to inform the Member States that EU law requires them to recognise, for all legal 
purposes, the familial ties among the members of a rainbow family coming from 





                                                 
6  J. Rijpma and N. Koffeman, ‘Free Movement Rights for Same-Sex Couples Under EU Law: What 
Role to Play for the CJEU?’ in D. Gallo, L. Paladini and P. Pustorino (eds), Same-Sex Couples Before 
National, Supranational and International Jurisdictions (Springer 2014) 461. 
7  Report on Round Table on Rainbow Families: from mutual recognition of rights in the EU to 
national strategies on marriage equality and/or civil union laws, p. 4 (Report available at 
<http://www.ilga-
europe.org/sites/default/files/20150618_ilga_europe_round_table_on_rainbow_families_-
_report.pdf> (accessed on 10.12.2018). The Report contrasts the approach of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Gas and Dubois v. France, no. 25952/07, 2012 (where the child 
was not a party to the case) with that in X and Others v. Austria, no. 19010/07, 2013 (where the 
child was a party to the case). See, also, L. Hodson, ‘Ties That Bind: Towards a Child-Centred 
Approach to Lesbian, Gay, Bi-Sexual and Transgender Families under the ECHR’ (2012) 20 
International Journal of Children’s Rights 501. 
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II Same-Sex Couples and Parental Rights in EU Member States: The Current 
Position 
 
The nuclear family, consisting of different-sex married spouses and their biologically-
linked children, was never the only form of family that existed, though, it is still ‘the 
gold standard against which all other family types are assessed’.8 Nonetheless, ‘the 
family’ is a flexible and adaptable unit and recent years have seen an increase in 
alternative families, many families now consisting of (unmarried) cohabitants and 
their children, children and their parents and step-parents, children and their single 
parent, and children and their same-sex parents.9 The law, therefore, not only needs 
to recognise such alternative families,10 but, also, to provide a system that is sensitive 
and responsive to their own specific needs.11  
 
Children in rainbow families can be from previous opposite-sex or same-sex 
relationships, the result of (initially) single parenthood, or the result of planned 
parenthood where the same-sex couple wishes to embark on parenting together.12 It 
is, of course, well-known that despite impressive advances in medicine and 
technology, same-sex couples are still incapable of having children who will be 
genetically related to both members of the couple.13  Such couples can, however, 
                                                 
8  S. Golombok, Modern Families: Parents and Children in New Family Forms (CUP, 2015) 4. See, 
also, A. Singer, ‘The Right of the Child to Parents’ in K. Boele-Woelki, N. Dethloff and W. Gephart 
(eds), Family Law and Culture in Europe: Developments, Challenges and Opportunities 
(Intersentia, 2014) 137-138. 
9  S. Golombok (above n. 8) 3; L. Hodson (above n. 7) 502-504. 
10  C. McGlynn, Families and the European Union: Law, Politics and Pluralism (CUP 2006) 39-41 and 
Chapters 4 and 5; L. Gonzalez, ‘“With Liberty and Justice for All [Families]”: The Modern 
American Same-Sex Family’ (2011) 23 St. Thomas Law Review 293. 
11  Opinion of AG Szpunar in Case C-335/17, Babanarakis EU:C:2018:242, para. 29. For an analysis 
of this argument see, inter alia, A. Bainham, ‘Family Law in a Pluralistic Society’ (1995) 22 Journal 
of Law and Society 234.  
12  M. M. Winkler, ‘Same-Sex Families Across Borders’ in D. Gallo, L. Paladini and P. Pustorino (eds), 
Same-Sex Couples Before National, Supranational and International Jurisdictions (Springer 2014) 
381. 
13  It is true that in the last few years, so-called ‘three-parent babies’ have been created with the 
use of a technique that mixes DNA from three persons. Nonetheless, so far, such techniques 
have only been used in situations where a woman has faulty mitochondria and, thus, needs 
those mitochondria to be exchanged with those of a healthy, unrelated, female egg donor in 
order to ensure that genetic diseases will not be passed from the mother to the child – see S. 
Reardon, ‘Genetic details of controversial “three-parent baby” revealed’, (2017) Nature 
<https://www.nature.com/news/genetic-details-of-controversial-three-parent-baby-revealed-
1.21761> (accessed on 08.01.2019); ‘UK doctors select first women to have “three-person 
babies”’, The Guardian, 1 February 2018 
<https://www.theguardian.com/science/2018/feb/01/permission-given-to-create-britains-
first-three-person-babies> (accessed on 08.01.2019). It is important to note that at the moment, 
there has been no discussion about creating ‘three-parent babies’ using the above technique in 
situations involving a healthy mother, for the purpose of overcoming the inability of a same-sex 
couple to have a child that is biologically related to both members of the couple. Nonetheless, 
what appear more promising for same-sex couples are recent experiments with mice that have 
shown that synthetic sperm and eggs can be created using stem cell technology, which can, 
potentially, enable same-sex couples to have children who are biologically related to both 
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become de facto joint parents in a number of ways, such as through donor 
insemination (known or anonymous), assisted reproductive technologies, surrogacy, 
by becoming the joint parents of children from a prior relationship of one of the 
members of the couple (step-child adoption), or through adoption.14 This means that 
in some situations, one of the members of the couple will be biologically connected 
to the child (e.g. when one of the female partners in a same-sex couple undergoes 
medically assisted procreation using her own egg or the egg of her partner),15 whilst 
in other situations (e.g. adoption or surrogacy used by a male same-sex couple with 
sperm donated from a third party) the child will be genetically linked to neither of the 
members of the couple. Rainbow families, therefore, challenge some of the main 
assumptions that underpin the nuclear family ideal, namely, that a family is comprised 
of an opposite-sex couple and that its children are biological descendants of their 
primary caregivers.16  
 
In terms of same-sex parenthood, the important questions that arise are whether, 
under a specific legal system, same-sex couples a) are allowed de facto to become the 
parents of a child and b) they can be recognised legally as the joint legal parents of the 
child (either automatically or after taking specific steps (e.g. adoption)).  
 
                                                 
members of the couple – see, for instance, ‘Artificial sperm and wombs offer new means of 
reproduction’, Financial Times, 8 December 2017 <https://www.ft.com/content/0f9b51d6-
c565-11e7-b30e-a7c1c7c13aab> (accessed on 08.02. 2019). 
14  For a clear explanation of these options see T. Amos and J. Rainer, ‘Parenthood for Same-Sex 
Couples in the European Union: Key Challenges’ in K. Boele-Woelki and A. Fuchs (eds), Same-Sex 
Relationships and Beyond: Gender Matters in the EU (Intersentia, 2017). 
15  In most EU Member States, motherhood is legally defined through birth and this is so even 
following advances in medicine which have made egg donation possible. This means that in 
rainbow families where the parents of the child are two women, in Member States which do not 
recognise same-sex couples as the joint parents of a child, the legal mother of the child will be 
the woman who gives birth to the child, irrespective of whether she is, also, the genetic mother 
of the child. Hence, in situations of intra-partner egg donation, the genetic mother of the child 
(the mother who provided the egg) will not be recognised in law as the mother of the child. For 
a brief discussion of this from a philosophical angle see P. Le Coz, ‘What does it mean to be a 
mother in this age of assisted reproductive technology?’ in B. Feuillet-Liger, T. Callus and K. Orfali 
(eds), Reproductive Technology and Changing Perceptions of Parenthood around the world 
(Bruylant, 2014).  
16  In other words, as explained by Déchaux, rainbow families challenge the ‘dominant kinship 
model’ – see J-H. Déchaux, ‘The Challenges of the New Reproductive Technologies: How Kinship 
Enters Politics’ in B. Feuillet-Liger, T. Callus and K. Orfali (eds), Reproductive Technology and 
Changing Perceptions of Parenthood around the world (Bruylant, 2014). As explained by the 
above author, ‘kinship model’ ‘is the series of laws, principles and beliefs which specify for a 
society or a given social group a definition of kinship, that is to say which attribute children to 
adults designated as parents’ (p. 312). The ‘dominant kinship model’ ‘is bilateral (a father and a 
mother), exclusive (only one father, only one mother) and bio-centric (the father and mother are 
presumed to be the progenitors of the child, since a man and a woman are needed to have a 
child)’ (p. 314). It should be noted, however, that ‘no kinship model is immutable’ (p. 312) and, 
thus, the legal recognition of parenthood in rainbow families simply requires the adoption of a 
different type of kinship model and, in particular, one which is not bio-centric whilst it can 
continue being bilateral, provided that the latter does not require that the parents are of 
different sexes. 
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The lack of EU competence on the matter as well as the lack of guidance at European 
level mean that the parental rights that same-sex couples enjoy at national level vary 
considerably throughout the EU. The most recent edition (at the time of writing) of 
ILGA Europe’s Rainbow map,17  demonstrates that only a minority of EU Member 
States provide full parental rights to same-sex couples: ‘[t]he idea that in order to 
thrive a child needs two parents of different sex who are in a committed relationship, 
translates in many jurisdictions into laws precluding different-sex cohabitants from 
adopting children and same-sex partners from both being acknowledged as legal 
parents of their children’.18  
 
At the moment of writing, joint adoption by same-sex couples is only allowed in half 
of the EU Member States, 19  as is the case for step-child adoption by same-sex 
couples. 20  Surrogacy is largely prohibited across EU Member States, 21  and most 
Member States even refuse to recognise children born of surrogacy arrangements 
made in other countries.22 This limits the parenting options for male same-sex couples 
to adoption.23 The law allows medically assisted procreation by (female) same-sex 
couples (as a couple) in only twelve EU Member States,24 whilst it is only in ten EU 
Member States that same-sex couples enjoy automatic recognition as co-parents.25 
                                                 
17  See ILGA Europe Rainbow Europe Package: Annual Review and Rainbow Europe Map 
<https://www.ilga-europe.org/resources/rainbow-europe/rainbow-europe-2018> (accessed 
on 22.11. 2018). 
18  N. Nikolina, ‘Evolution of parenting rights in Europe – a comparative case study about questions 
in section 3 of the LawsAndFamilies Database’ in K. Waaldijk, More and more together: Legal 
family formats for same-sex and different-sex couples in European countries: Comparative 
analysis of data in the LawsAndFamilies Database, Working Paper 75 (2017) in the 
FamiliesandSocieties Working Paper Series, 
<https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/54628/Waaldijk%20-
%20More%20and%20more%20together%20-
%20FamiliesAndSocietiesWorkingPaper%2075%282017%29.pdf?sequence=3> (accessed on 
22.11.2018), 102. 
19  Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK. 
20  Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the UK. 
21  For a comparative study of EU Member States’ approach to surrogacy see L. Brunet and others, 
A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States (2013), 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2013/474403/IPOL-
JURI_ET(2013)474403_EN.pdf> (accessed on 12.10.2018). For a recent chapter on surrogacy in 
the EU see I. Rein-Lescastereyres, ‘Recent Case Law on Cross-Border Surrogacy’ in Boele-Woelki 
and A. Fuchs (eds), Same-Sex Relationships and Beyond: Gender Matters in the EU (Intersentia, 
2017).  
22  M. M. Winkler (above n. 12) 390-393. 
23  For a piece on surrogacy (in general) and the main objections towards it see K. Orfali, ‘The 
Contested Terrain of Surrogate Motherhood’ in B. Feuillet-Liger, T. Callus and K. Orfali (eds), 
Reproductive Technology and Changing Perceptions of Parenthood around the world (Bruylant, 
2014).  
24  Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, and the UK. 
25  Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the UK. 
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All in all, in a little less than half of the EU Member States (namely, twelve Member 
States) same-sex couples are unable to be recognised (legally) as co-parents.26  
 
Accordingly, it is clear that in EU Member States, there is currently a legal patchwork 
regarding the legal recognition of the parental status of same-sex couples, this 
reflecting how controversial the matter is.27 In fact, rainbow parenting is considered 
to be the most controversial issue in relation to the legal recognition of same-sex 
relationships and its prohibition is often used as the strongest card by governments 
wishing to pass legislation offering a legal status to same-sex couples: in exchange of 
securing approval for legislation which legally recognises same-sex couples, 
governments promise that they will not provide parenting rights to such couples.28  
 
The concept of ‘family’, therefore, differs from Member State to Member State, and 
only some EU Member States fully recognise rainbow families under the law by 
allowing the couple’s intent to override the biological relationship between the child 
and one or both of his/her parents. In most EU Member States, a child born to a same-
sex couple has only one legal parent, which means that the other parent of the child 
is not afforded any legal recognition as a parent. Thus, in a number of EU Member 
States, rainbow families are rendered invisible within society and its legal structures 
and cannot legally establish the familial links among (all) their members. As Hodson 
has aptly put it, ‘[t]he extent to which a child’s family is recognised in Europe is, at 
present, a haphazard accident of geography’.29 
 
This is clearly problematic as, apart from the emotional significance that the 
recognition of a child as the child of both of his/her parents has, being considered the 
child of one’s parents is important from a practical and legal perspective as well, since 
it is only in this way that parents can fulfil their obligations to their child and the child 
can claim rights as their child.30 For instance, it is only (legal) parents that benefit from 
                                                 
26  These are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia.  
27  See P. Dunne, ‘Who is a Parent and Who is a Child in a Same-Sex Family? – Legislative and Judicial 
Issues for LGBT Families Post-Separation, Part I: The European Perspective’, (2017) 30 Journal of 
the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers 27, 31 (and the references in footnote 13 of that 
article). Hodson has, also, noted that although the ECtHR now recognises de facto families as 
valid families that are entitled to the protection of their rights, nonetheless, at present it 
‘provides too little guidance on matters of family rights and equality for children raised in LGBT 
families’ and ‘in short, the ECtHR has failed to grapple adequately with the dynamics of LGBT 
family life’ - L. Hodson (above n. 7) 519. For a historical analysis of the law in the US as regards 
parenting by same-sex couples see N. D. Polikoff, ‘Lesbian and Gay Couples Raising Children: The 
Law in the United States’ in R. Wintemute and M. Andenas (eds), Legal Recognition of Same-Sex 
Partnerships: A Study of National, European and International Law (Hart, 2001). 
28  See, for instance, the discussions in Cyprus, France, Italy, and Greece, where as a political 
compromise deemed necessary to convince the more traditional sections of the legislature to 
accept the introduction of legal recognition of same-sex couples, co-parenting by same-sex 
couples (or, in the case of France, some forms of co-parenting) was left out or subsequently 
removed from the proposed legislation. 
29  L. Hodson (above n. 7) 520.  
30  A. Koppelman, Same Sex Different States: When Same-Sex Marriages Cross State Lines (Sheridan, 
2006) 73-74. 
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administrative privileges in relation to the child (such as the capacity to consent to 
medical care and open a bank account for the child), travel alone with the child, or 
provide health insurance for the child. In addition, in systems where an ius sanguinis 
approach is adopted, children can only acquire the nationality of a country from 
persons who are recognised, in law, as their parents. If the parent who is not legally 
recognised as their parent dies intestate, his/her children will not be entitled to inherit 
his or her property. Moreover, if it is the legal parent that dies, the child becomes an 
orphan and it is then up to the family of the legally recognised parent or, in the 
absence of that, the State, to determine if the non-recognised parent will be allowed 
to, even, maintain links with the child and, ideally, be recognised as the child’s parent. 
The child, also, does not have any (legal) ties with the family of origin of the parent 
who is not legally recognised as a parent.31  
 
The above list is not exhaustive,32 but it paints a picture of the kinds of struggles same-
sex couples and their children may suffer as a result of the failure of the law to 
recognise their familial ties. The failure to legally recognise the parent-child 
relationship creates uncertainty and, with it, insecurity both for the parents and the 
child as it, in effect, denies their relationship. It can, also, cause bureaucratic 
complications and unnecessary delays. One should, also, not ignore the psychological 
consequences that this can have both for the parents and the child, not least as a 
result of the stigma to which rainbow families are commonly exposed. As has been 
noted by another commentator, ‘the legal invisibility of same-sex parents in nations 
around the world leaves them vulnerable to the loss of their rights as a family unit and 
requires partners, parents and children to engage in additional relational work to feel 
socially legitimated as a family’.33 
 
This brief section aimed to provide the reader with some background information 
regarding the regulation of parenting by same-sex couples in individual EU Member 
States and to expose the difficulties that rainbow families face at national level. This 
article, nonetheless, is not concerned with the question whether EU Member States 
are required by EU law to make it possible for same-sex couples to become the joint 
parents of a child in their territory and to be legally recognised as such under their own 
legal system: in other words, the article’s aim is not to examine whether EU law 
requires Member States to introduce legislation which enables rainbow families in 
their territory to legally establish familial ties among their members ab initio. This is a 
matter – after all – which, as will be explained below, falls outside EU competence 
and, thus, from the point of view of EU law, Member States can adopt towards it the 
approach that is most appropriate within their own socio-political context. What this 
                                                 
31  For the importance of legally recognising a child’s ties with their parents’ families of origin see 
Marckx v. Belgium, no. 6833/74, 1979, paras 44-48. 
32  For a more detailed analysis of the problems faced by rainbow families as a result of the non-
recognition of the parental ties between a child and (usually) his/her non-biological parent see 
L. Hodson, ‘The Rights of Children raised in lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender families: A 
European perspective’, ILGA-Europe 2008 <https://www.ilga-europe.org/resources/ilga-
europe-reports-and-other-materials/rights-children-raised-lesbian-gay-bisexual-or> pp. 29-32 
(accessed on 17.12.2018). 
33  R. Wilding, Families, Intimacy and Globalization (Palgrave, 2018) 6. 
 9 
article aims to explore is, rather, whether EU law can require Member States, in 
situations where there is an exercise of free movement rights by rainbow families, to 
legally recognise the familial links between the children and both of their parents, as 
these have already been legally established elsewhere (i.e. in countries which have 
legislation which permits rainbow families to legally establish such links). The 
remaining of this article, therefore, is devoted to this question. 
 
 
III Free Movement And Family Reunification Under EU Law: The Position of 
Children 
 
EU law grants to all EU citizens the right to move and reside freely in the territory of 
another Member State. The right derives from the free movement of persons 
provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),34 which 
prohibit obstacles to the exercise of this right. These provisions also grant a number 
of additional rights to Member State nationals, most notably, the right not to be 
discriminated against on the ground of nationality.35  
 
Yet, the free movement of persons provisions have never made reference to the 
family of the migrant Union citizen. However, being aware of the importance of family 
life for all human beings and – more pragmatically – of the fact that Union citizens 
would be impeded from moving if the host State refused to admit their close family 
members within its territory, since the 1960s, the secondary legislation 
complementing the free movement of persons provisions grants family reunification 
rights to Union citizens who move between Member States.36  
 
Currently, the main source of such rights is Directive 2004/38.37 The Directive applies 
only to ‘Union citizens who move to or reside in a Member State other than that of 
which they are a national’. 38  However, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has 
extended its application ‘by analogy’ to Union citizens who return to their Member 
State of nationality after having spent a period of ‘genuine residence’ in the territory 
                                                 
34  The right is now laid down in Article 21 TFEU and – the leges speciales to it – Articles 45, 49, and 
56 TFEU. 
35  See, e.g. Case 167/73, Commission v. France EU:C:1974:35. Article 21 TFEU does not explicitly 
prohibit discrimination on the ground of nationality and, thus, in case-law, it has been applied 
together with Article 18 TFEU in order to prohibit discrimination on this ground. 
36  Case 249/86 Commission v. Germany EU:C:1989:204, para. 11. For an analysis of family 
reunification rights under EU free movement law see C. Berneri, Family Reunification in the EU: 
The Movement and Residence of Third Country National Family Members of EU Citizens (Hart, 
2017). 
37  Council and Parliament Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family 
members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States [2004] OJ L 
158/77. 
38  Ibid., Article 3. Emphasis added. 
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of another Member State, during which they established and strengthened family 
life.39  
 
Directive 2004/38 grants to Union citizens the automatic right to be joined or 
accompanied by their ‘family members’ in the territory of the Member State to which 
they move, i.e. the host State is required by EU law to admit the family members 
within its territory without applying its own immigration requirements, and this is so 
irrespective of whether the family member is a Union citizen or not.40 It should be 
underlined that family reunification rights – as rights which follow from the EU right 
to free movement – are directly granted by EU law only to Union citizens who exercise 
their right to move and reside in the territory of another Member State. Family 
members, therefore, enjoy family reunification rights only as a result of their 
relationship with the Union citizen and, thus, their rights are derivative. Of course, 
family members who hold Union citizenship enjoy free movement rights on their own 
right and, thus, in most instances, do not need to claim (derivative) rights which 
emerge as a result of their relationship with the Union citizen who decides to move. 
However, in the context of rainbow families, the applicability of EU law is also 
practically significant in situations where (derivative) family reunification rights are 
claimed by family members who do possess Union citizenship, as for them it will be 
important to be legally recognised as the ‘family members’ of the Union citizen, 
especially in Member States which do not recognise them as such under their national 
laws.  
 
In order for family reunification rights to be meaningful, they need to be 
supplemented by a number of additional (related) rights which have as their aim to 
ensure that the family can become integrated into the society of the host Member 
State. Accordingly, provision for this is made in Directive 2004/38 and other pieces of 
secondary legislation which supplement the free movement of persons provisions.41 
This means that whether the family members qualify as a ‘family’ for the purposes of 
the grant of EU family reunification rights, will not only determine if they will all be 
able to be admitted into – and granted a right to reside in – the territory of the host 
Member State, but will also determine if they will be able to benefit from a host of 
other rights,42 such as the right for the family members to work in the host Member 
                                                 
39  Case C-370/90, Singh EU:C:1992:296; Case C-456/12, O. and B. EU:C:2014:135; Case C-673/16, 
Coman EU:C:2018:385. 
40  Recital 5, Directive 2004/38 (above n. 37). It is throughout its text that the Directive makes it 
clear that the family members of Union citizens can accompany or join them in the host Member 
State and, hence, reference will not be made to specific Articles of the Directive from which 
family reunification rights are derived. 
41  See, especially, Regulation 492/2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union 
[2011] OJ L 141/1. 
42  C. Berneri (above n. 36) 1 (footnote 2). 
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State,43 and the right for the children of the family to receive study finance in the host 
State under the same conditions as this is granted to the nationals of that State.44  
 
For the purposes of Directive 2004/38, ‘family members’ are defined in Article 2(2) as:  
‘(a) the spouse;  
(b) the partner with whom the Union citizen has contracted a registered partnership, 
on the basis of the legislation of a Member State, if the legislation of the host Member 
State treats registered partnerships as equivalent to marriage and in accordance with 
the conditions laid down in the relevant legislation of the host member State;  
(c) the direct descendants who are under the age of 21 or are dependants and those 
of the spouse or partner as defined in point (b); and  
d) the dependent direct relatives in the ascending line and those of the spouse or 
partner as defined in point (b).’  
 
For family members that do not fall within the above list, Article 3(2) of the Directive 
provides: 
‘Without prejudice to any rights to free movement and residence the persons 
concerned may have in their own right, the host Member State shall, in accordance 
with its national legislation, facilitate entry and residence for the following persons:  
(a) any other family members, irrespective of their nationality, not falling under the 
definition in point 2 of Article 2 who, in the country from which they have come, are 
dependants or members of the household of the Union citizen having the primary 
right of residence, or where serious health grounds strictly require the personal care 
of the family member by the Union citizen;  
(b) the partner with whom the Union citizen has a durable relationship duly attested.’  
 
Persons that only fall within the Art. 3(2) categories, cannot require the host State to 
automatically accept them within its territory but can only require it to justify its 
decision in case it chooses not to admit them – to do so, it will need to demonstrate 
that it has undertaken an extensive examination of their personal circumstances.45  
 
It should be noted that all Union citizens – including children – can exercise free 
movement rights and claim family reunification rights under EU law. As the ECJ has 
confirmed, ‘[t]he capacity of a national of a Member State to be the holder of rights 
guaranteed by the Treaty and by secondary law on the free movement of persons 
cannot be made conditional upon attainment by the person concerned of the age 
prescribed for the acquisition of legal capacity to exercise those rights personally’.46  
 
                                                 
43  Directive 2004/38 (above n. 37), Article 23. 
44  Article 10 Regulation 492/2011 (above n. 41) and Joined Cases C-389-390/87, Echternach and 
Moritz EU:C:1989:130. 
45  Case C-83/11, Rahman EU:C:2012/519. 
46  Case C-200/02, Zhu and Chen EU:C:2004:639, para. 20. See C. Sawyer, ‘Civis Europeanus sum: 
the citizenship rights of the children of foreign parents’ (2005) Public Law 477; A. Tryfonidou, 
‘Kunqian Catherine Zhu and Man Lavette Chen v. Secretary of State for the Home Department: 
Further Cracks in the “Great Wall” of the European Union?’ (2005) 11 European Public Law 527. 
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Given that the article shall focus on the position of the children of rainbow families, I 
shall here confine myself to summarising the four ways in which children (in general) 
can benefit from family reunification rights under EU free movement law.  
 
First, a child can fall under the Article 2(2)(c) category of Directive 2004/38, when (s)he 
is the ‘direct descendant’ of a Union citizen who exercises free movement rights or of 
the spouse or registered partner of that Union citizen.47 The child can fall within this 
category irrespective of whether (s)he is a Union citizen, but (s)he can only be covered 
if under the age of 21 or a dependant of his/her parent(s).  
 
Secondly, under the Article 2(2)(d) category of the Directive, if the child is a Union 
citizen and is not dependent on his/her parent(s), (s)he can act as the ‘sponsor’ of 
family reunification (and related) rights for his/her parent(s), if the latter are not EU 
citizens and thus do not enjoy free movement rights themselves.  
 
Thirdly, in Zhu and Chen,48 the Court held that minors who are Union citizens and wish 
to exercise their right to move and reside in the territory of another Member State in 
their own right, can claim the right to be joined or accompanied by their primary carer 
in the host State, provided that the family is economically self-sufficient.49 This right 
is derived directly from Article 21 TFEU. Prior to this, in Baumbast, it was held that the 
children (whether they are EU citizens or not, and whether they are minors or not) of 
a ‘worker’ (within the meaning of Article 45 TFEU) who have moved to the host 
Member State with him and have exercised their derivative right to enrol in full-time 
education there, can themselves ‘sponsor’ a right of residence for their primary carer 
(irrespective of whether the primary carer is an EU citizen or not), if they need the 
presence and the care of  that person in order to be able to continue to pursue and 
complete their education in that Member State.50 It should be noted, however, that 
                                                 
47  In the recent Coman case (above n. 39), the ECJ interpreted the term ‘spouse’ for the purposes 
of Article 2 of Directive 2004/38, to include the same-sex spouse of a Union citizen who moves 
and resides in the territory of another Member State. Accordingly, when the parents of a child 
in a rainbow family are married, the host Member State should recognise them as such, and, 
hence, even if the host Member State refuses to legally recognise the child as the child of one 
of his/her parents, if the parent who is not legally recognised as such is the Union citizen, the 
child can still derive family reunification rights from that parent, as it is considered as the child 
of the Union citizen’s spouse. The ECJ has not yet had the opportunity to clarify the meaning of 
‘registered partner’ and, in particular, to rule on whether it includes same-sex registered 
partners. For an analysis of Coman see, inter alia, D. Kochenov and U. Belavusau (above n. 3); A. 
Tryfonidou, ‘The ECJ Recognises the Right of Same-Sex Spouses to Move Freely between EU 
Member States: The Coman Ruling’ (2019) European Law Review (forthcoming).  
48  (above n. 46), paras 26-34.  
49  It should be noted that given that the article is about the free movement rights of rainbow 
families, the possibility of employing the principle established in Case C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano 
EU:C:2011:124, which enables children who are Union citizens to continue to reside in the 
territory of the Member State of their nationality with their primary carer, will not be considered 
here. 
50  Case C-413/99, Baumbast and R EU:C:2002:493, paras 68-75. This right is derived from (what is 
now) Article 10 of Regulation 492/2011 (above n. 41). See, also, Case C-310/08, Ibrahim 
EU:C:2010:80; Case C-480/08, Teixeira EU:C:2010:83; Case C-529/11, Alarape EU:C:2013:290; 
and Articles 12 and 13 of Directive 2004/38 (above n. 38). For an analysis of the principles 
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this is so only where one of the parents of the children is a ‘worker’ (and – thus – 
applies in a narrower set of circumstances than the Zhu and Chen principle does), and 
in this context it is not necessary that the family is economically self-sufficient. 
 
Finally, if a child does not fall within any of the above categories, (s)he can try to rely 
on Article 3(2)(a) of Directive 2004/38, as a dependant or member of the household 
of the Union citizen. Alternatively, if the child is a Union citizen, (s)he can be the 
sponsor of (non-automatic) family reunification rights, if the persons that wish to join 
the child can prove that they are members of the child’s household in the home 
Member State or are dependent on the child. 51 But as seen earlier, in both these 
cases, the decision whether to admit the family members falls entirely within the 
discretion of the host Member State and a decision to admit them under this category 
does not presuppose recognition of their familial ties.  
 
Children who come from a traditional, nuclear, family can, clearly, qualify as ‘direct 
descendants’ – and their parents as ‘direct relatives in the ascending line’ or as 
‘primary carers’ – for the purposes of the above categories; there has never been a 
case where the familial links between children and their biological parents have been 
legally questioned in this context. In addition, certain non-traditional families are, also, 
covered by the Directive; for instance, Article 2(2)(c) of the Directive recognises the 
link between children and their (heterosexual) step-parents, as it explicitly provides 
that a Union citizen has the right to be joined in the host State by, inter alia, the 
children of his/her spouse or registered partner. Those families whose members fall 
within the above categories can, therefore, feel certain that their decision to exercise 
EU free movement rights, will not give rise to a separation of the members of the 
family as all will have the right – deriving from EU law – to be admitted to the territory 
of the host Member State and to be allowed to reside there. What is more, they are 
aware that they will be entitled to claim all rights reserved for families, once they are 
admitted into the territory of the host Member State, since they will be recognised as 
a ‘family’.  
 
The important question for our purposes, nonetheless, is whether the term ‘family’ – 
for the purposes of EU free movement law – includes rainbow families. In particular, 
the question that will be explored in the next section will be whether the categories 
of family members enumerated in Directive 2004/38 cater for the children of rainbow 
families by recognising their relationship with (both of) their parents, as this has been 
lawfully established in a legal system which permits same-sex couples to jointly parent 




                                                 
established in the cases mentioned in this paragraph see H. Stalford, Children and the European 
Union: Rights, Welfare and Accountability (Hart, 2012) 72-78. 
51  If the child is a minor it is unlikely that a relationship of dependency satisfying the requirements 
of this provision (i.e. the parent being (materially) dependent on the child) will be found – see 
Zhu and Chen (above n. 46), paras 43-44; Case C-40/11, Iida EU:C:2012:691, paras 54-56. 
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IV  Rainbow Families and EU Free Movement Law: The Current (Unclear) 
Position 
 
As we saw in section II, currently, only a handful of EU Member States fully recognise 
rainbow families in their legal systems. Accordingly, when exercising free movement 
rights deriving from EU law, rainbow families may end up in legal limbo: if the Member 
State to which they move does not allow same-sex couples in its territory to become 
co-parents, it is likely that it will refuse to recognise, also, the parent-child relationship 
between a child and one or, sometimes, even both of his/her same-sex parents, as 
this has been legally established elsewhere. Thus, when rainbow families move 
between EU Member States, the children may face losing legal ties to one or both of 
their parents, something which will undoubtedly lead them to grow up in fear and 
uncertainty as well as suffer a number of legal and other practical disadvantages, such 
as those we saw earlier in section II, when considering non-recognition of rainbow 
families in a single-country context.  
 
As regards family reunification (and related) rights, as seen in the previous section, 
the applicable EU legislation – Directive 2004/38 – simply speaks about ‘direct 
descendants’ and ‘relatives in the ascending line’, without interpreting these terms in 
more detail. Moreover, there is no established EU definition for the words ‘parent’, 
‘primary carer’, or ‘child’,52 which means that it is not clear if, for the purposes of EU 
law, the relationship between a child and both of his/her same-sex parents is 
recognised and, in particular, whether EU law legally recognises the non-biological 
parent as a ‘parent’. McGlynn has stressed that the requirement in the 2004 Directive 
that the children be the ‘direct descendants’ of the Union citizen (or his/her spouse or 
registered partner) ‘does, unfortunately, raise a question regarding adopted children 
or those born using fertility treatments where the child cannot be said to be a direct 
“descendant”’.53 On the other hand, Stalford appears more optimistic and argues that 
the reference in the same Directive to the ‘direct descendants’ of the EU citizen or 
his/her spouse or partner seems to imply that ‘children with no direct biological link 
to EU migrant adults (the primary beneficiaries of free movement entitlement) can 
now benefit from the panoply of entitlement previously restricted to their biological 
children’ and considers that it includes step-children, adopted or foster children, or 
even the children of the migrant’s unmarried partner.54 This seems to be the view, 
also, espoused by the ECJ as from its case-law to date we know that a biological link 
between a child and the Union citizen from whom the family reunification rights are 
derived, is not required.55  The Court, in particular, has made clear that the step-
children of the Union citizen who exercises free movement, can join or accompany 
him or her in the host Member State and can enjoy a number of additional rights, such 
as the right to have access to education in the host State under the same terms as this 
                                                 
52  See para. 7 of the Opinion of AG Tesauro in Case C-7/94 Gaal EU:C:1995:29. See, also, H. Stalford 
(above n. 50) 21. 
53  C. McGlynn (above n. 10) 48. 
54  H. Stalford (above n. 50) 24. 
55  See H. Stalford (above n. 50) 23-24; F. Emmert, ‘The Family Policy of the European Community’ 
in K. Waaldijk and A. Clapham (eds), Homosexuality: A European Community Issue (Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1993) 370. 
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is available to nationals of that State.56 Moreover, children who are Union citizens can 
‘sponsor’ the right of residence of a third-country national primary carer who is not 
genetically linked to them.57  
 
Nonetheless, to date, no case has been referred to the ECJ involving the free 
movement rights of rainbow families and, hence, the Court has not been given the 
opportunity to rule on the matter. Accordingly, although it seems that the absence of 
a biological connection between a child and his/her parent does not, in itself, negate 
the parent-child relationship for the purposes of EU law, it is not clear if this is the 
case, also, in situations where that parent is in a same-sex relationship with the child’s 
other parent. The lack of clarity in the terms used in the 2004 Directive and the judge-
made category of ‘primary carer’, and the absence of any clarification offered by the 
ECJ as regards the children of rainbow families in particular, has given cause to 
Member States which do not make provision for such families within their own legal 
system, to believe that they are free to refuse to recognise the familial links between 
the members of such families when they move to their territory in exercise of EU free 
movement rights.58 Accordingly, when rainbow families move, the legal ties binding 
their members are put in jeopardy. 
 
In some cases, the legal ties between a child and both of his/her parents will dissolve 
when the family moves to another Member State. For instance, prior to the change of 
the law in Portugal in 2016, in one case the Portuguese authorities refused to 
recognise the parental ties between a child and both of the adoptive same-sex parents 
                                                 
56  Baumbast (above n. 50), para. 57. 
57  Joined Cases C-356-357/11, O, S and L EU:C:2012:776, para. 55. On the facts of the case, this 
right was derived from Article 20 TFEU, as the case did not involve the exercise of free movement 
rights, but it is unlikely that the Court will adopt a different position in situations involving the 
exercise of free movement under Article 21 TFEU or the other free movement of persons 
provisions. 
58  The recent Regulation 2016/1191 on promoting the free movement of citizens by simplifying 
the requirements for presenting certain public documents in the European Union and amending 
Regulation 1024/2012 [2016] OJ L200/1, does not provide much assistance to rainbow families 
as it merely concerns the authenticity of the document, not the recognition of its content. The 
same is the case for Council Regulation 2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental 
responsibility, repealing Regulation 1347/2000 (Brussels IIA) (2003) OJ L338/29, which provides 
that where a court order as to parental authority has been made in another EU Member State 
(other than Denmark) in respect of a child, and the court has jurisdiction in the matter, that 
court order must be recognised in other EU Member States without any special procedure being 
required. Rainbow families are unlikely to benefit from this piece of legislation either as, on the 
one hand, adoption is excluded from the Regulation’s scope and, on the other hand, it provides 
for an exception where recognition would be ‘manifestly contrary to the public policy of the 
Member State in which recognition is sought’, which would most probably be relied on by 
Member States that refuse to legally recognise the parent-child relationship between a child in 
a rainbow family and one (or both) of his/her parents. In addition, the Regulation expressly 
excludes establishing or contesting the parent-child relationship. For more on Brussels IIA see 
N. Lowe and G. Douglas, Bromley’s Family Law (OUP, 2015) 994-1008. 
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– as these were established in Belgium via an adoption order – because Portuguese 
law at the time did not allow adoptions by same-sex couples.59 
 
In other cases, it is only the legal links between the child and one of her parents (the 
non-birth mother or the non-biological parent) that are not recognised, when the 
family moves to another Member State. This is demonstrated by a petition recently 
made to the Committee of Petitions (PETI) of the European Parliament, by Eleni 
Maravelia, a Greek national who is married to a British woman.60 Ms Maravelia gave 
birth to a daughter in Spain in 2014. The Spanish birth certificate of the daughter of 
the couple indicates both Ms Maravelia and her spouse as parents of the child. Yet, in 
Greece – which does not legally recognise same-sex couples as co-parents – they were 
told that only the birth mother is recognised as the parent of the child, this making Ms 
Maravelia the sole parent of the child for the purposes of Greek law.  
 
Of course, it should be noted that not all Member States which do not allow same-sex 
parents in their territory to legally establish ties with their children refuse to recognise, 
also, the legal ties established between a child and his/her parents elsewhere. For 
instance, in Italy a number of cases have been heard in recent years, and courts have 
ruled that second-parent adoption orders issued in another Member State should be 
recognised by the Italian civil registrars and that the latter must recognise the birth 
certificate of a child by another Member State which indicated that two women were 
the child’s parents.61 Similarly, very recently, the Supreme Administrative Court of 
Poland allowed both of the mothers of a child – as reflected in a British birth certificate 
–  to be legally recognised as such in Poland.62 
 
                                                 
59  Report on Round Table on Rainbow Families (above n. 7) p. 3. For additional examples of the 
non-recognition of the legal ties between a child and both of his/her same-sex parents, as these 
have been established elsewhere, see M. M. Winkler (above n. 12) 388-389. 
60  Petition No 0513/2016 by Eleni Maravelia (Greek) on the non-recognition of LGBT families in the 
European Union < 
https://petiport.secure.europarl.europa.eu/petitions/en/petition/content/0513%252F2016/ht
ml/Petition-No-0513%252F2016-by-Eleni-Maravelia-%2528Greek%2529-on-the-non-
recognition-of-LGBT-families-in-the-European-Union> (accessed on 22.06.2018). For additional 
examples see NELFA Public Petition to EU Commissioner Viviane Reding ‘Same-Sex Parents and 
their Children demand True Freedom of Movement in the European Union’ (24.09.2013) 
<http://lgbt-families.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2013/05/NELFAPetitiontoCommissionerRedingFINAL.pdf> (accessed on 
17.01.2019); and NELFA ‘Freedom of Movement in the European Union: Obstacles, Cases, 
Lawsuits …’ (January 2019) http://nelfa.org/inprogress/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/NELFA-
fomcasesdoc-2019-1.pdf (accessed on 21.01.2019). 
61  ILGA Europe Annual Review 2018, available at <https://www.ilga-
europe.org/sites/default/files/Attachments/annual_review_final2018_web.pdf> p. 78 
(accessed on 20.12.2018). See, also, footnotes 65 and 66 in S. Marinai, ‘Recognition in Italy of 
same-sex marriages celebrated abroad: The importance of a bottom-up approach’ (2016) 9 
European Journal of Legal Studies 10, for references to such cases. 
62  See ‘Gay couple can register child in conservative Poland – court’, Reuters, 11 October 2018 
<https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-poland-gayrights/gay-couple-can-register-child-in-
conservative-poland-court-idUKKCN1ML1PC> (accessed on 15.10.2018). 
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In any event, research has shown that once the parents are admitted to their territory, 
host States tend to facilitate the entry and residence also of the children of a rainbow 
family, as per the Article 3(2)(a) category of Directive 2004/38, even if their laws do 
not recognise them as the children of their parents.63  In other words, the Article 
3(2)(a) category achieves the perfect compromise for Member States which do not 
allow same-sex parenting in their territory, as it does not make reference to familial 
links but merely speaks about ‘dependants’ or ‘members of the household’ of a Union 
citizen – thus, it does not presuppose the recognition of the actual familial links 
between the child and both of his same-sex parents, which is, exactly, what the host 
Member State usually wishes to avoid.  
 
Hence, in most cases, the main issue appears to be not so much whether rainbow 
families will be able to move to another Member State (i.e. an ‘access’ issue) but, 
rather, how they will be able to move: once admitted within the territory of the host 
State, will they be recognised as a ‘family’ for all legal purposes, with the legal ties 
connecting the parents and their child(ren) remaining intact?  
 
Research on the cross-border legal recognition of rainbow families and the legal status 
attached to their members has ‘revealed a chaotic mosaic of full, partial, unclear, and 
denied recognitions’.64 The non-recognition of the legal ties between a child and one 
or both of his/her parents demonstrates that some EU Member States insist on failing 
to recognise the social realities of the familial relationships of the children of rainbow 
families, in this way jeopardising their legal security. And this is so even if the children 
and their parents do enjoy in another country the security of having their ties legally 
recognised. As another commentator has pointed out when writing on this topic in 
the US context, ‘these children can have their entire life turned upside down by simply 
crossing a state border’.65  
 
The next section will, therefore, be devoted to an analysis of the ways in which the 
failure of the host EU Member State to recognise the legal ties (as these have been 
established elsewhere) between a child and both of his/her parents, can breach a 
number of rights that the child enjoys under EU law.  
 
 
V Is the Refusal of the Host Member State to Recognise the Legal Ties Among the 
Members of a Rainbow Family that Moves to its Territory a Breach of EU Law? 
 
Traditionally, opposite-sex married spouses and their (biological) children have 
constituted the only recognised form of ‘family’ for legal purposes. This had been the 
                                                 
63  Cara-Friend Northern Ireland, ‘Handbook on the Rights of Rainbow Families: Rights on the move’ 
(2014), p. 28, <https://www.ilga-europe.org/sites/default/files/rights_on_the_move_-
_handbook_on_the_rights_of_rainbow_families_2015.pdf> (accessed on 10.05.2018). 
64  K. Waaldijk, ‘The Right to Relate: A Lecture on the Importance of Orientation in Comparative 
Sexual Orientation Law’ (2013) 24 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 161, 198. 
65  L. S. Anderson, ‘Protecting Parent-Child Relationships: Determining Parental Rights of Same-Sex 
Parents Consistently Despite Varying Recognition of their Relationship’ (2006) 5 Pierce Law 
Review 1, 2. 
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approach not merely of individual EU Member States but, also, of the EU itself.66 Such 
an approach ignored the existence of (inter alia) rainbow families. Nonetheless, the 
sands have started shifting, albeit slowly, and a number of (western) EU Member 
States now view and recognise rainbow families as legitimate families that must have 
equal protection under the law. But has there been a change, also, in the EU’s 
approach? 
 
The European Parliament – the most pro-LGB among the EU institutions – has 
repeatedly made calls to the other institutions, to create a legal framework at EU level 
which, whilst it respects the competence of the Member States in the family law field, 
it recognises and protects the rights of rainbow families who make use of EU free 
movement rights.  
 
For instance, back in 1994 – at a time when only one EU Member States (Denmark) 
offered some form of legal recognition to same-sex relationships – the Parliament had 
issued a Resolution, noting, inter alia, that the Commission should draft a 
Recommendation on equal rights for lesbians and homosexuals, which would, as a 
minimum, seek to end ‘the barring of lesbians and homosexual couples from marriage 
or from an equivalent legal framework, and should guarantee the full rights and 
benefits of marriage, allowing the registration of partnerships’ as well as ‘any 
restrictions on the rights of lesbians and homosexuals to be parents or to adopt or 
foster children’. 67  Moreover, in its recent Resolution on protection and non-
discrimination with regard to minorities in the EU Member States,68 the Parliament, 
inter alia, recommended the provision of clear and accessible information on the 
recognition of cross-border rights for LGBTI persons and their families in the EU69 and 
urged the Commission to ensure that Member States correctly implement Directive 
2004/38, consistently respecting, inter alia, the provisions related to family members 
and prohibiting discrimination on any grounds. 70  In the same Resolution, the 
Parliament called on the Commission to take action in order to ensure that LGBTI 
individuals and their families can exercise their right to free movement in accordance 
with both Article 21 TFEU and Article 21 EUCFR.71 
                                                 
66  H. Stalford, ‘Concepts of Family under EU Law – Lessons from the ECHR’ (2002) 16 International 
Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 410; C. McGlynn (above n. 10). 
67  European Parliament Resolution on equal rights for homosexuals and lesbians in the EC A3-
0028/94 (1994) OJ C 61/40. 
68  Resolution on protection and non-discrimination with regard to minorities in the EU Member 
States 2017/2937(RSP), available at 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bMOTION%2bB8-2018-
0064%2b0%2bDOC%2bXML%2bV0%2f%2fEN&language=EN> (accessed on 25.06.2018). This 
motion was, in fact, the European Parliament’s response to the PETI public hearing organised by 
the Committee on Petitions (PETI) entitled ‘Fighting against discrimination of EU citizens in the 
EU Member States and the protection of minorities’ that took place on 4 May 2017, where the 
Petition submitted by Eleni Maravelia (above n.60) was heard. 
69  Resolution on protection and non-discrimination with regard to minorities in the EU Member 
States (above n. 68) para. 19. 
70  Ibid., para. 20. 
71  Ibid., para. 21. 
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Yet, despite the Parliament’s repeated calls for a legal framework which caters for the 
needs of rainbow families and which grants them equal protection and equal rights to 
those enjoyed by the traditional nuclear family, the EU has, to date, buried its head in 
the sand in relation to this matter. The other EU institutions have chosen to ignore 
social reality, with the result that rainbow families live in a state of legal uncertainty: 
a mere attempt to exercise the core – free movement – rights they enjoy under EU 
law, often brings them face to face with the harsh reality that their family is not 
recognised in many EU Member States.  
 
Member States which refuse to recognise the legal status attached to familial 
relationships legally established elsewhere will, usually, claim that this is required by 
national law or by public policy principles, and that private international law rules 
allow them the freedom to do so. However, as noted by Biagioni, ‘in several occasions 
it has been argued that the application of private international law rules cannot lead 
to interferences with a status established under a foreign law, insofar as the creation 
of a limping status can result into a violation of fundamental rights’.72 
 
Accordingly, the question that this section shall aim to answer is whether the refusal 
of the host Member State to legally recognise the familial ties among the members of 
a rainbow family – as these have been established and recognised elsewhere – 
breaches fundamental rights protected under EU law. The section will, therefore, 
focus on whether the EU has the competence and the tools to require its Member 
States to legally recognise the familial links between the members of rainbow families 
in situations where such families move between Member States.   
 
 
 V.1 DOES THE EU HAVE THE COMPETENCE TO ACT? 
 
As is well-known – and as has been repeatedly confirmed by the ECJ73 – family law is 
an area that still broadly falls within the regulatory purview of Member State 
competence. Thus, the EU does not have competence in the family law field but, 
merely, a limited power to adopt harmonising measures on family law with cross-
border implications.74 It has, therefore, been left to the Member States to decide what 
legal recognition, if any, will be given to same-sex couples in their territory.75 Similarly, 
                                                 
72  G. Biagioni, ‘On Recognition of Foreign Same-Sex Marriages and Partnerships’ in D. Gallo, L. 
Paladini and P. Pustorino (eds), Same-Sex Couples Before National, Supranational and 
International Jurisdictions (Springer 2014) 360-361. 
73  Case C-267/06, Maruko EU:2008:179, para. 59 ; Case C-443/15, Parris EU:C:2016:897, 
para. 59; Coman (above n. 39), para. 37. 
74  Article 81(3) TFEU – such measures require the unanimous approval of the Council of the EU. H. 
Stalford, ‘For Better, For Worse: The Relationship between EU Citizenship and the Development 
of Cross-border Family Law’ in M. Dougan, N. Nic Shuibhne and E. Spaventa (eds), Empowerment 
and Disempowerment of the European Citizen (Hart, 2012). 
75  This is also the approach adopted by the ECtHR when interpreting the ECHR, in view of a lack of 
European consensus on the matter among the signatory states – see, for instance, Schalk and 
Kopf v. Austria, no. 30141/04, 2010, para. 61, X and Others v. Austria (above n. 7) para. 106, and 
Chapin and Charpentier v. France, no. 40183/07, 2016, paras 38-39 and 48. For comments see 
N. Bamforth, ‘Families but not (yet) marriages? Same-sex partners and the development 
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it is left to EU Member States to decide whether they will allow same-sex couples in 
their territory to become de facto parents and to establish a family under the law.76 
This deference to Member State choices with regards to these matters is, also, 
reflected in the text of the human rights instruments of both the Council of Europe (of 
which all EU Member States are members) and of the EU: Article 12 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) provides the right to marry and to found a family 
‘according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right’, whilst Article 9 of 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCFR) notes that the same right ‘shall be 
guaranteed in accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of these 
rights’. 
 
Yet, even when they act in areas that fall within their exclusive competence, Member 
States must act in a way which respects their obligations under EU law.77  
 
Among these, is the obligation to respect the right to free movement of Union citizens, 
which is considered one of the fundamental rights deriving from EU law. In particular, 
in situations which fall within the scope of EU law by virtue of the (mere) exercise of 
free movement rights by a Union citizen, Member States must comply with their 
obligations under the EU free movement provisions and the secondary legislation 
complementing them. As explained elsewhere, the ECJ has made it clear in a number 
of cases that in order for a situation to fall within the scope of the free movement of 
persons provisions, it suffices that a Union citizen has exercised free movement rights; 
it is not, in addition, necessary to prove that on the facts of the case, there is an 
interference with the exercise of those rights.78  
                                                 
European Convention “margin of appreciation”’ (2011) 23 Child and Family Law Quarterly 128; 
H. Fenwick, ‘Same sex unions at the Strasbourg Court in a divided Europe: driving forward reform 
or protecting the court’s authority via consensus analysis?’ (2016) European Human Rights Law 
Review 248. However, if domestic law creates a family status other than marriage (e.g. 
registered partnership) it must do so without discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation, 
meaning that it must be open to both same-sex and opposite-sex couples (see, e.g. Vallianatos 
v. Greece, no. 29381/09, 2013) – see M. Fichera, ‘Same-Marriage and the Role of Transnational 
Law: Changes in the European Landscape’ (2016) 17 German Law Journal 383, 397. However, 
see, also, Oliari v. Italy, no. 18766/11 and 36030/11, 2015,  which seems to have created an 
obligation for ECHR signatory States to provide a legal framework for the recognition of same-
sex relationships, though it may be that the ECtHR has imposed this obligation specifically on 
Italy (the State concerned) because legal and political factors particular to Italy were taken into 
account by the ECtHR when establishing this. For a discussion see A. Hayward, ‘Same-Sex 
Registered Partnerships – A Right to Be Recognized?’ (2016) 75 Cambridge Law Journal 27. 
76  This is also the approach adopted by the ECtHR when interpreting the ECHR – see, for instance, 
E.B. v. France, no. 43546/02, 2008, where the Court held that ‘the provisions of Article 8 do not 
guarantee either the right to found a family or the right to adopt … The right to respect for 
“family life” does not safeguard the mere desire to found a family’ – para. 41. However, if 
domestic law creates a right to found a family by, e.g. adopting a child, it must do so without 
discrimination on, inter alia, the ground of sexual orientation – see also X and Others v. Austria 
(above n. 7).  
77  Case C-148/02, Garcia Avello EU:C:2003:539, para. 25; Case C-353/06, Grunkin and Paul 
EU:C:2008:559, para. 16; Case C-438/14, Bogendorff von Wolffersdorff EU:C:2016:401, para. 32; 
Coman (above n. 39) para. 38 
78  See, among others, Garcia Avello (above n. 77), para. 24; Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk 
EU:C:2001:458, para. 33; Case C-224/98, D’Hoop EU:C:2002:432, para. 29. For an explanation 
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Furthermore, Member States must comply with their obligations regarding the 
respect of fundamental (human) rights, as these are protected under EU law. The 
EUCFR provides that Member States are bound by it ‘when they are implementing EU 
law’,79 the latter having been interpreted, in some cases, broadly, to mean situations 
that fall within the scope of EU law.80 Similarly, fundamental human rights which form 
part of the general principles of EU law have been held to bind the Member States 
when they are acting as agents of the EU,81 as well as when they derogate from their 
obligations under EU law,82 whilst in some cases the Court went even further, holding 
that they bind Member States in all situations that fall within the scope of EU law.83 
Thus, the EUCFR and the general principles of EU law appear to bind the Member 
States to the same extent,84 though, it is not yet entirely clear when national measures 
can be deemed to fall within the scope of application of EU law for the purposes of EU 
fundamental rights protection.85   
 
Hence, in situations which fall within the scope of EU law by virtue of the fact that a 
Union citizen has exercised free movement rights, the EU institutions and the Member 
States must act in a way which is compliant with the free movement provisions and 
the fundamental human rights that are protected under EU law. 86  And even if a 
narrower approach is taken, according to which the above provisions and rights are 
applicable only in situations where free movement rights are breached (i.e. not merely 
exercised) and Member States seek to derogate from their obligations under the free 
movement provisions, situations involving the non-recognition by the host State of 
rainbow families which have been lawfully established elsewhere are, still, covered 
since – as will be seen subsequently in this section – in such instances there is always 
an obstacle to the exercise of free movement rights.  
                                                 
see A. Tryfonidou, The Impact of Union Citizenship on the EU’s Market Freedoms (Hart, 2016) 
86-88. 
79  Article 51 EUCFR.  
80  See, inter alia, Case C-459/99, MRAX EU:C:2002:461; Case C-390/12, Pfleger EU:C:2014:281. 
81  See, for instance, Case 5/88, Wachauf EU:C:1989:321. 
82  See, for instance, Case C-260/89 ERT EU:C:1991:254. 
83  See, for instance, Case 12/86 Demirel EU:C:1987:400.  
84  C-617/10, Fransson EU:C:2013:105, paras 17-22. M. Dougan, ‘Judicial Review of Member State 
Action under the General Principles and the Charter: Defining the ‘Scope of Union Law’” (2015) 
52 Common Market Law Review 1201, 1204-1207; P. Craig and G. de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases 
and Material (OUP 2015) 415; R. Schütze, European Union Law (CUP 2018) 480-481. This seems 
to be, also, supported by the Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] 
OJ C303/120 (Explanation on Article 51). 
85  P. Craig and G. de Búrca (above n. 84) 415-418; R. Schütze (above n. 84) 478-479. 
86  Writing back in the 1990s, commentators have gone as far as to suggest that as regards obstacles 
to the free movement of lesbian and gay Member State nationals, ‘[t]here can be little doubt 
that, as these obstacles hamper the establishment of the internal market (Article 100a and 8a) 
or the establishment or functioning of the common market (Article 100), the Community has the 
power and arguably even the duty to propose harmonizing legislation, in accordance with Article 
3(h), aimed at removing these obstacles’ – F. Snyder, H. Somsen and H. D. Hoyer, ‘Subsidiarity: 
an Aspect of European Community Law and its Relevance to Lesbians and Gay Men’ in K. 
Waaldijk and A. Clapham (eds), Homosexuality: A European Community Issue (Martinus Nijhoff, 
1993) 235.  
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Before proceeding to examine whether EU Member States breach their obligations 
under EU law when they refuse to recognise the familial ties among the members of 
rainbow families coming from other Member States, it should be underlined that the 
problem that is examined in this article – i.e. the cross-border legal recognition of the 
familial ties of rainbow families which have already been lawfully established 
elsewhere – is different from the situation where a State refuses to allow same-sex 
couples to become, and be legally recognised as, the joint parents of a child in the first 
place. In particular, in the former, there is severance of familial ties which have been 
already validly formed elsewhere, whereas in the latter scenario, what is at issue is 
the legal choice made by a Member State as to whether it will allow – in the first place 
– same-sex couples to become the joint parents of a child and to be legally recognised 
as such. What is more, in the former scenario, the severance of the familial ties is a 
direct result of the exercise of rights granted by EU law – the exercise of free 
movement rights – whereas the second scenario involves a purely internal matter 
which does not have any link with EU law. Since in situations involving the refusal to 
provide for the cross-border legal recognition of the familial ties in rainbow families 
that move, the breach of a number of rights emerges as a side-effect of the exercise 
of EU free movement rights, the EU itself should provide the solution to this 
problem.87 Moreover, the principle of subsidiarity would seem to require this as well, 
given that Member States acting alone cannot provide a solution, as it is a matter that 




V.2 IS THE REFUSAL OF THE HOST STATE TO RECOGNISE THE FAMILIAL TIES AMONG 
THE MEMBERS OF A RAINBOW FAMILY WHEN THE FAMILY MOVES TO ITS 
TERRITORY A BREACH OF THE EU FREE MOVEMENT PROVISIONS? 
 
As noted earlier, the free movement of persons provisions in the FEU Treaty prohibit 
national measures which impede the free movement of Union citizens between 
Member States. Union citizens have been given the right to be accompanied or joined 
by their close family members in the Member State to which they move, exactly 
because the refusal to allow them to do so would deter them from exercising their 
free movement rights and would, thus, create an obstacle to free movement. The 
same rationale lies behind the grant of a number of additional rights to the family of 
the Union citizen, which have as their aim the smooth integration of the family into 
the society of the host Member State. As the ECJ has recently emphasised on a 
number of occasions, the effectiveness of EU free movement rights requires that a 
Union citizen’s family life which has been created or strengthened in one Member 
State ‘may continue when he returns to the Member State of which he is a national’89 
                                                 
87  For an analysis of this line of reasoning see A. Tryfonidou, Reverse Discrimination in EC Law 
(Kluwer, 2009) 167-170. 
88  H. Stalford (above n. 50) 20. 
89  Coman (above n. 39) para. 24; O. and B. (above n. 39) para. 54; Case C-291/05, Eind 
EU:C:2007:771, para. 36; Case C-40/11, Iida (above n. 51), para. 70. 
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and, obviously, also, when he settles in a Member State other than that of his 
nationality.  
 
The same rationale, naturally, applies in the context of rainbow families. To 
paraphrase the ECJ in its judgment in Carpenter,90 the separation of the members of 
a rainbow family would be detrimental to their family life and, therefore, to the 
conditions under which the member or members of the family who hold Union 
citizenship exercise free movement rights. In particular, in situations where a rainbow 
family moves from a Member State where all its members live together (whether this 
is because their familial ties are legally recognised in that Member State or not), to 
one that does not admit one or more of those family members because it does not 
recognise their familial ties with the Union citizen(s) who exercised free movement 
rights, there is a clear causal link between the exercise of free movement rights and 
the loss of the right of the family to live together in the same Member State: it is 
because a Union citizen moves to a Member State which does not recognise rainbow 
families that (s)he loses the right to live together with his/her family members. 
 
However, the Court has gone even further and made it clear in Metock,91 that even 
less direct links between a national measure and an obstacle to the exercise of free 
movement rights suffice for a finding of a breach of EU law: an obstacle to the exercise 
of the right to move and reside in the territory of another Member State can emerge 
as a result of a refusal of family reunification rights even in instances where the 
members of the family had not previously lived together in the territory of another 
Member State. This is because ‘if Union citizens were not allowed to lead a normal 
family life in the host Member State, the exercise of the freedoms they are guaranteed 
by the Treaty would be seriously obstructed’.92 Hence, it does not matter that the 
family members have not lived together in the territory of another Member State 
prior to the exercise of free movement rights: an obstacle to free movement exists as 
long as there is an exercise of free movement by a Union citizen and a refusal by the 
host Member State to admit within its territory his/her family members.   
 
It is, thus, clear that in situations where a child is a Union citizen and (s)he is not 
allowed to be accompanied or joined by both of her parents in the host State – 
because the legal links between the members of the family, as legally established 
elsewhere, are not recognised in the host State – the child’s right to move and reside 
in the territory of another Member State will be breached. Similarly, in situations 
where, for the same reason, a Union citizen cannot be accompanied or joined by 
his/her (same-sex) spouse/partner and/or the children of the couple, (s)he will be 
deterred from exercising free movement rights.93  Accordingly, and since Directive 
2004/38 – a piece of secondary legislation – needs to be read in a way which complies 
with primary EU law provisions, and, in particular, with the free movement provisions 
                                                 
90  Case C-60/00, Carpenter EU:C:2002:434. 
91  Case C-127/09, Metock and Others EU:C:2008:449, paras 58-70. For an explanation of this aspect 
of the judgment see C. Berneri (above n. 36) 58-61. 
92  Metock (above n. 91) para. 62. 
93  For a similar argument in the US context see A. Koppelman (above n. 30) 74-76. 
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and the prohibition of discrimination on, inter alia, the ground of sexual orientation 
as laid down in Article 21 EUCFR,94  the terms ‘descendants’ and ‘relatives in the 
ascending line’ must be read in a way which includes children and parents which 
constitute a rainbow family.95  The same approach should, obviously, be followed 
when interpreting the judge-made term ‘primary carer’, for the purposes of Articles 
20 and 21 TFEU. 
 
In addition – and to take the argument even further – it would seem that the mere 
negative climate towards rainbow families in a certain Member State may be capable 
of impeding the free movement of such families to that Member State and may, thus, 
constitute an obstacle to free movement. Whether this would amount to a potential 
obstacle – and would, thus, be caught by EU free movement law – or, simply, a 
hypothetical obstacle – which would, as such, escape the ambit of the free movement 
provisions, is not entirely clear, as the distinction between the two is rather 
nebulous.96 Situations which involve action that creates a negative climate against a 
specific minority have been held to be contrary to EU anti-discrimination law and, in 
particular, Directive 2000/78,97 even if there is no identifiable ‘victim’. In Asociația 
                                                 
94  Moreover, Recital 31 of Directive 2004/38 provides that the Directive ‘respects the fundamental 
rights and freedoms and observes the principles recognised in particular by the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In accordance with the prohibition of discrimination 
contained in the Charter, Member States should implement this Directive without discrimination 
between the beneficiaries of this Directive on grounds such as […] sexual orientation’. 
95  Whether a uniform, autonomous, EU interpretation of these terms which does not make 
reference to national legislation (whether of the home State or the host State) or whether the 
home State or host State principle should be adopted for this purpose, will need to be clarified 
by the ECJ, once and if it is given the opportunity. If the former option is chosen (i.e. 
autonomous, EU, definition) and the definition  provided considers the children of same-sex 
parents as the children of both of their parents for the purposes of EU free movement law, this 
will mean that in situations where rainbow families move between Member States, they will be 
able to rely on Directive 2004/38 to require the host Member State to admit the whole family 
within its territory, recognising – for that purpose – the familial links between the children of 
the family and both of their parents. Of course, in order for the familial ties among the members 
of a rainbow family to be legally recognised in the host State, they must have been legally 
established somewhere, though it is not necessary that these are established and/or recognised 
in the Member State from which the family moves. If the home State principle is chosen, on the 
other hand, some – albeit more limited – protection will be afforded, as this will require that 
rainbow families that are recognised as families in their home Member State will be able to carry 
their status and the legal recognition of their familial links with them to the host State, when 
claiming family reunification rights. Conversely, if the host State principle is chosen, this will 
mean that the host State will be allowed to refuse to recognise the links between the children 
of rainbow families and both of their parents, and, thus, refuse them family reunification rights, 
irrespective of whether those links are legally recognised in the Member State from which the 
family comes.  
96  See A. Tryfonidou, ‘(Further) Signs of a Turn of the Tide in the CJEU’s Citizenship Jurisprudence: 
Case C-40/11, Iida, Judgment of 8 November 2012’, (2013) 20 Maastricht Journal of European 
and Comparative Law 302, 307-313. 
97  Directive 2000/78 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and 
occupation [2000] OJ L 180/22. 
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Accept,98 the ECJ found that the prohibition of discrimination on the ground of sexual 
orientation under the 2000 Directive could be breached simply as a result of a 
homophobic statement made by a person associated with a football team with 
regards to the appointment of gay football players in general (i.e. without there being 
an identifiable, openly gay or bisexual, player who had been refused employment or 
dismissed by the said football team). This demonstrates that the prohibition laid down 
in the above instrument aims not merely to eradicate specific instances of 
discrimination on the prohibited grounds but, also, more broadly, a negative climate 
against members of specific minorities.99 Whether the free movement provisions can 
be breached by national laws which lead to such a negative climate remains to be 
seen, nonetheless. 
 
Now, assuming that a rainbow family is actually admitted to the host Member State, 
this is not the end of the story. If the host Member State does not legally recognise 
the family ties between the members of the family for other legal purposes (e.g. tax 
law, property law, inheritance law, nationality law, pensions, and so on) this will cause 
great inconvenience to the members of the family which, in its turn, will impede the 
exercise of their free movement rights. In Garcia Avello and Grunkin Paul,100 the ECJ 
noted that the denial of the host State to recognise the surnames of Union citizens 
registered in another Member State and the resultant discrepancy in surnames in 
different Member States, led to serious inconvenience for the persons concerned 
which, in its turn, was likely to deter them from exercising their free movement rights. 
If we transpose this reasoning to the context of rainbow families, it is clear that the 
denial of the host State to legally recognise the familial ties between the members of 
the family – as these are legally recognised in one of the EU Member States – once the 
family is within its territory, and the resultant discrepancy in the legal ties among the 
members of the family in different EU Member States, can constitute an obstacle to 
free movement.101 Again, the causal link between the contested refusal to recognise 
the familial links among the family members and the obstacle to free movement is 
obvious: it is because a Union citizen wishes to move to a Member State that does not 
recognise rainbow families that his/her familial links will not be legally recognised and, 
as a result of that, (s)he and his/her family will suffer serious inconvenience due to the 
discrepancy in the legal ties recognised in different Member States.102 
                                                 
98  Case C-81/12, Asociaţia Accept EU:C:2013:275. For excellent commentary on the case see U. 
Belavusau, ‘A Penalty Card for Homophobia from EU Non-Discrimination Law: Comment on 
Asociaţia Accept (C-81/12)’ (2015) 21 Columbia Journal of European Law 329. 
99  A. Tryfonidou, ‘Discrimination on the Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity’ in S. 
Vogenauer and S. Weatherill (eds), General Principles of Law: European and Comparative 
Perspectives 386-387. See, also, Λ. Παπαδοπούλου, ‘Ο σεξουαλικός προσανατολισμός και η 
ταυτότητα του φύλου στο δίκαιο της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης και στη νομολογία του ΔΕΕ’ σε Π. 
Νάσκου-Περράκη, Ν. Γαϊτενίδης και Σ. Κατσούλης (επ), Ευρωπαϊκές πολιτικές από και προς την 
προστασία των θεμελιωδών δικαιωμάτων (Εκδόσεις Σακκουλα, 2018) 204-205. 
100  Above n. 77. 
101  For a similar argument see H. Toner, ‘Migration Rights and Same-Sex Couples in EU Law: A Case 
Study’ in K. Boele-Woelki and A. Fuchs (eds), Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships in 
Europe: National, Cross-Border and European Perspectives (Intersentia, 2012) 304-305. 
102  For a similar argument with regards to the legal status attached to same-sex relationships see 
G. Biagioni (above n. 72) 376-377. Note, however, that in such cases an obstacle to free 
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As is well-known, a finding that a measure can impede the exercise of free movement 
does not, automatically, mean that there is a breach of EU law. Obstacles to free 
movement can be justified on a number of (non-economic) grounds, which are either 
explicitly noted in the Treaty (the Treaty derogations) or which have been established 
in the Court’s case-law (the objective justifications). In cases involving rainbow 
families and their refusal to recognise them, Member States would probably try to 
rely on the ground of public policy – which is one of the Treaty derogations – and their 
interest in preserving their national identity,103 as was done in the recent case of 
Coman, where Romania refused to recognise a same-sex marriage lawfully concluded 
in another Member State for the purpose of granting family reunification rights. 
However, and agreeing with the ECJ in Coman, an obligation to (simply) recognise the 
status attached to a same-sex relationship in another EU Member State and – I would 
add – to recognise the parental linkage (as established elsewhere) between one or 
both of the parents in a same-sex relationship and their child, ‘does not undermine 
the national identity or pose a threat to the public policy of the Member State 
concerned’.104 Such an obligation in no way requires a Member State to introduce, 
within its territory, legislation that enables same-sex couples to create a family and to 
be legally established as the joint parents of a child, but it merely requires a Member 
State to refrain from severing the legal links between a child and his/her parent(s) as 
these have already been established elsewhere, as otherwise there would be an 
obstacle to free movement.105  
                                                 
movement can only arise if the familial ties are legally recognised in a Member State (usually 
this being the home Member State) and, thus, there will be a discrepancy in the recognition of 
the legal ties among the members of the family in different EU Member States. 
103  Article 4(2) TEU. 
104  Coman (above n. 39) para. 46. 
105  The Court in Coman (above n. 39) used the requirement of ‘genuine residence’ (introduced in a 
previous case which did not involve same-sex couples (O. and B (above n. 39), para. 51-54) in 
order to ensure that same-sex couples cannot evade the laws of their Member State of 
nationality and residence by trying to introduce same-sex marriage through the backdoor. In 
particular, in Coman it was made clear that same-sex spouses can claim family reunification 
rights on their return to their Member State of nationality only if they have taken-up genuine 
residence (i.e. residence for over three months) in the territory of another Member State and 
during that period of genuine residence they have established and strengthened family life in 
the territory of that State. This means that an LGB Union citizen cannot simply visit another 
Member State for a few days simply in order to get married to his/her same-sex partner, and 
then return to his/her Member State of nationality where, relying on EU law, (s)he will require 
that State to recognise his/her spouse as a spouse for the purpose of family reunification. This, 
also, means that it is likely that in case it is made clear that EU law requires the Member State 
to which a rainbow family moves/returns to legally recognise the familial links among the 
members of the family, this will be the case only if the family has taken-up ‘genuine residence’ 
in the territory of another Member State during which it established and strengthened family 
life. Hence, for instance, French women who cross the border to Belgium for a few days to 
undergo artificial insemination (in this way evading the French prohibition on artificial 
insemination by lesbian couples), will not be able on their return to France to rely on EU free 
movement law to require that Member State to recognise the familial links among the members 
of their family, as the requirement of ‘genuine residence’ in the territory of another Member 
State will not have been satisfied – for a study into the experiences of French lesbian women 
who go to Belgium to undergo assisted reproduction therapy see W. Van Hoof, G. Pennings, P. 
De Sutter, ‘Cross-border reproductive care for law evasion: A qualitative study into the 
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In any event, even if it is accepted that the contested refusal of recognition can, in 
principle, be justified on the above grounds, the offending Member States will still 
face a number of other hurdles when seeking to derogate from their obligations under 
the free movement provisions. 
 
As laid down in Article 27(2) of Directive 2004/38, measures taken by the host 
Member State relying on the public policy ground ‘shall be based exclusively on the 
personal conduct of the individual concerned’. This will, clearly, not be satisfied where 
Member States engage in a blanket refusal to legally recognise the exact family ties of 
the members of all rainbow families, as in this way they impede the free movement 
rights of a whole category of persons (LGB individuals who are in a same-sex 
relationship and their children), and, hence, the exclusion of those persons from free 
movement is not based on their personal conduct. 
 
Furthermore, as is well-established, a national measure that is liable to obstruct the 
exercise of freedom of movement for persons may be justified only where such a 
measure is consistent with the fundamental (human) rights which are guaranteed 
under EU law.106 As will be seen in the next sub-section, the refusal to legally recognise 
the familial links between a child and his/her parent(s) in a rainbow family, as these 
have been established elsewhere, is capable of breaching a number of fundamental 
human rights that the child derives from the EUCFR and which are, also, protected as 
general principles of EU law. Hence, and also for this reason, the obstacle to free 
movement that emerges as a result of the refusal of the host State to recognise the 
familial links among the members of a rainbow family, cannot be justified.  
 
Accordingly, the refusal of the host Member State to legally recognise the familial ties 
among the members of a rainbow family, as these have been legally established 
elsewhere, amounts to a breach of the EU free movement provisions. This is so, in 
particular, when  it leads to a) the denial of family reunification rights, and/or b) the 
denial of rights to which the family would have been entitled to after gaining access 
to the territory of the host State if it was legally recognised as a ‘family’, such as social 
assistance benefits, pension entitlements, and tax advantages which are reserved for 
legally recognised ‘families’. 
 
 
V.3 IS THE REFUSAL OF THE HOST STATE TO RECOGNISE A RAINBOW FAMILY AS A 
‘FAMILY’ A BREACH OF FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTED UNDER EU 
LAW? 
 
Under EU law, fundamental human rights have been protected as part of the general 
principles of EU law since the late 1960s.107 With the coming into force of the Treaty 
                                                 
experiences and moral perspectives of French women who go to Belgium for treatment with 
donor sperm’ (2015) 124 Social Science & Medicine 391.  
106  ERT (above n. 82); Case C-368/92, Familiapress EU:C:1997:325; Carpenter (above n. 90); Coman 
(above n. 39). 
107  Case 29/69, Stauder EU:C:1969:57. 
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of Lisbon in 2009, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) has been amended, and, as a 
result of that, its Article 6 provides that the EUCFR has the same legal value as the 
Treaties and, thus, produces legally binding effects.108 Hence, in the EU, there are 
currently two parallel sources of fundamental human rights protection, which, to a 
great extent, overlap: the EUCFR and the general principles of EU law. For our 
purposes, the Treaty of Lisbon changes are, also, important in that they added 
‘protection of the rights of the child’ to the list of general objectives of the EU,109 
which, essentially, means that the interpretation of the provisions of the constituent 
EU Treaties (the TEU and TFEU), as well as all EU actions, must be informed by, inter 
alia, this objective. As noted by the Commission in its EU Agenda for the Rights of the 
Child ‘[t]he action of the EU should be exemplary in ensuring the respect of the 
provisions of the Treaties, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
and of the UNCRC with regard to the rights of children’.110 
 
Although the ECHR is not an EU instrument, it has, nonetheless, always had a 
significant impact on the development of EU fundamental human rights protection, 
being recognised as a source of ‘guidelines’ for the ECJ when determining which 
fundamental human rights form part of the general principles of EU law and how these 
must be interpreted.111 In addition, it plays a crucial role in the interpretation of the 
EUCFR, as Article 52(3) of the latter provides that ‘In so far as this Charter contains 
rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights 
shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not 
prevent Union law providing more extensive protection’. The latter proviso 
demonstrates that although the approach adopted in the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) can inform the ECJ’s rulings on the 
protection of fundamental rights which are protected under EU law, there is nothing 
to stop the Luxembourg Court from providing more extensive protection than its 
Strasbourg counterpart.  
 
Given that there have been no ECJ rulings which can contribute to the development 
of an argument in cases involving rainbow families, the analysis that will follow will 
consist of an examination of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR on the parent-child 
relationship, as this can, clearly, inform the argument that EU law requires the cross-
border legal recognition of rainbow families. However, it is important to remember 
that, as noted in the previous paragraph, the protection afforded by EU law can be 
more extensive than that provided under the ECHR, especially in view of the fact that 
the Preamble to the Charter states that it aims to ‘strengthen the protection of 
fundamental rights’ in the light of ‘changes in society’ and ‘social progress’. Hence, the 
ECtHR jurisprudence that will be analysed merely provides a floor which the EU can 
                                                 
108  T. Hickman, ‘Beano No more: The EU Charter of Rights After Lisbon’ (2011) 16 Judicial Review 
113. 
109  Article 3(3) TEU. 
110  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions: An EU Agenda for the Rights 
of the Child COM(2011) 60 final, p. 14. 
111  Case 4/73, Nold EU:C:1974:51. 
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use as a basis for developing more extensive rights in situations involving rainbow 
families that move between EU Member States. 112 
 
As will be seen, the ECtHR interpretation of a number of ECHR rights can, clearly, assist 
rainbow families. Accordingly – and given that all EU Member States are signatories 
to the ECHR – rainbow families may be able to have recourse to the ECHR in order to 
obtain redress when the EU Member State to which they move refuses to recognise 
the legal ties among their members, as these are legally recognised in other countries. 
However what this article will aim to show is that if rainbow families wish to have 
recourse to EU law in order to require the host Member State to recognise the familial 
ties among their members, they can clearly do so, not merely by relying on the EU free 
movement provisions (as seen in the previous sub-section) but, also, by relying on the 
fundamental human rights protection offered by EU law.113  
 
One point that should be underlined is that, so far, all cases of the ECtHR involving 
rainbow families have been approached from the point of view of the parents – in 
other words, the question has been whether the rights enjoyed by the parents have 
been breached as a result of the contested national measure. 114  In this article, 
however, a different perspective will be taken (that of the child) and, thus, the 
question will be whether the contested severance – in law – of the familial ties in 
rainbow families in cases where the family moves between EU Member States, can 
breach the fundamental human rights of the children of rainbow families. In addition, 
many of the issues raised in situations involving the children of rainbow families have 
been raised in different contexts – e.g. in situations involving single-parent families or 
where an opposite-sex couple had recourse to a surrogacy arrangement. For the 
purposes of this article – and where appropriate115 – the principles established in 
those cases will be transposed to the context of rainbow families and, in particular, 







                                                 
112  J. Rijpma and N. Koffeman (above n. 6) 465. 
113  For a comparison between the ECJ and ECtHR approaches to sexual orientation and gender 
identity discrimination see R. Wintemute, ‘In Extending Human Rights, which European Court is 
Substantively “Braver” and Procedurally “Fitter”?’ in S. Morano-Foadi and L. Vickers (eds), 
Fundamental Rights in the EU (Hart, 2015). 
114  For a criticism of this approach which seems to be leaving the question of the child’s best 
interests outside the equation see the dissenting opinion of Judge Villiger in Gas and Dubois 
(above n. 7). 
115  It should be kept in mind that for some legal purposes, the situation of a rainbow family is not 
similar to that of a family comprised of an opposite-sex couple and their children; in particular, 
the classic distinction between married and unmarried couples – endorsed by the ECtHR – is 
maintained in this context as well: accordingly, an unmarried (same-sex) couple is considered 
not to be similarly situated with a married (opposite-sex) couple, for most legal purposes – see, 
for instance, Boeckel and Gessner-Boeckel v. Germany, no. 8017/11 (case declared inadmissible).  
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V.3.1. Breach of the Right to Private and Family Life 
 
The right to private and family life is protected as a general principle of EU law,116 as 
well as under Article 7 EUCFR.117 In fact, the right consists of four separate (sub-)rights: 
the right to private life, the right to family life, the right to a home, and the right to 
communications. In this part of the article, it will be argued that in situations where 
the host Member State refuses to legally recognise the child-parent relationship, as 
this has been lawfully established in another country, the child of a rainbow family can 
rely on the private and family life aspects of Article 7 EUCFR and the general principles 
of EU law, to claim that there is a breach of EU law. 
 
The ECtHR held in Gas and Dubois v. France that a same-sex couple and their child(ren) 
can together enjoy ‘family life’, within the meaning of Article 8 ECHR.118 This follows 
the general approach of the ECtHR, according to which biological ties are not an 
overriding factor in establishing family life and some evidence of real and constant 
relationship is normally required before such relationships are afforded the protection 
of Article 8 ECHR.119 Accordingly, the ECtHR has made it clear that the non-biological 
parent of a child in a rainbow family can be considered a ‘parent’ for the purposes of 
Article 8 ECHR, provided that the relationship between the two resembles what is 
perceived to be ‘the norm’ of the nuclear family.120 Obviously, the same interpretation 
must be followed for the purposes of Article 7 EUCFR. Hence, in situations where the 
child in a rainbow family has established de facto ‘family ties’ with both of his/her 
parents, it is undisputed that family life exists between the members of the family; 
and, a fortiori, this is the case when those family ties have, already, been legally 
recognised somewhere. 
 
Yet, the ECtHR is still of the view that it is up to the signatory states to determine 
whether they will afford the right to same-sex couples to become parents jointly and, 
if yes, whether they will afford any legal recognition to the de facto familial ties among 
the members of a rainbow family.121 Accordingly, even though the members of a 
rainbow family can enjoy ‘family life’ within the meaning of Article 8 ECHR, it is not a 
breach of that provision if the State where the family lives does not legally recognise 
                                                 
116  See, e.g. Carpenter (above n. 90), para. 41. 
117  Article 7 EUCFR provides: ‘Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, 
home and communications’. For an analysis of the ECJ’s approach towards the right to family 
life under EU law see S. Iglesias Sánchez and K. Carr, ‘The right to family life in the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights’ in M. González Pascual and A. Torres Pérez (eds), The Right to Family Life 
in the European Union (Routledge, 2017). 
118  Gas and Dubois v. France (above n. 7), para. 37. See, also, X and Others v. Austria (above n. 7) 
paras 95-96; Boeckel and Gessner-Boeckel v. Germany (above n. 115) para. 27. The Court, also, 
held that a trans man, his female partner, and their child which was biologically related only to 
the female partner can enjoy ‘family life’ within the meaning of Article 8 ECHR – see X, Y and Z 
v. UK, App. No. 21830/93, 1997, para. 37. 
119  J.R.M. v. the Netherlands, no. 16944/90, 1993; Nylund v. Finland, no. 27110/95, 1999; K. and T. 
v. Finland, no. 25702/94, 2001. See L. Hodson (above n. 7) 507-509; G. Van Bueren, Child rights 
in Europe (Council of Europe Publishing, 2007) 119. 
120   C. McGlynn (above n. 10) 15.  
121  See footnote 76 above. 
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the familial ties among (some of) the members of the family and, in particular, 
between a child and his/her non-biological parent. This seems to be in line with the 
ECtHR’s ruling in Marckx v. Belgium,122 where it was held that Article 8 ‘implies the 
existence in domestic law of legal safeguards that render possible as from the moment 
of birth the child’s integration in his [biological] family’.123 The same approach was 
subsequently taken in Johnston v. Ireland, 124 where the ECtHR found Ireland to be in 
breach of the right to family life of a child and her (biological) parents, as a result of 
the fact that the child’s natural family ties to her (biological) father could not be legally 
recognised because her parents could not marry on account of the indissolubility – 
due to the Irish constitutional prohibition on divorce at the time – of the father’s 
marriage to another woman with whom he had separated. In both of these cases the 
ECtHR seems to have emphasised the biological connection between the child and 
his/her parent and, thus, the obligation imposed on States to provide legal recognition 
to the parent-child relationship by making provision in their laws for that relationship 
to be established in law, seems to be confined to situations where the parent and the 
child are biologically related.125 Hence, when it comes to rainbow families, the above 
rulings can only help children whose familial ties with their biological parent are not 
legally established, but they come empty-handed for children who wish to have their 
familial ties with their non-biological parent established ab initio.126  
 
However, the facts of the above cases were confined within one and the same State 
and did not touch on the issue of the cross-border legal recognition of the parent-child 
relationship. Moreover, as we saw, they did not concern the relationship between a 
child and his/her non-biological parent. 
 
The ECtHR was confronted with both of the above issues in Wagner v. Luxembourg,127 
albeit not in a context involving a rainbow family. At issue in the case was the refusal 
of the Luxembourg authorities to recognise the Peruvian court decision pronouncing 
the full adoption by Ms Wagner – a Luxembourg national – of her child, JMWL, of 
Peruvian nationality. The refusal was the result of the absence in the Luxembourg 
legislation of provisions allowing an unmarried person to obtain full adoption of a 
child. The Court held that this refusal amounted to an unjustified interference with 
the right to respect for Ms Wagner’s and her child’s family life and, thus, amounted to 
an infringement of Article 8 ECHR. The Court, in particular, noted that ‘[b]earing in 
                                                 
122  Marckx v. Belgium (above n. 31). 
123  ibid., para. 31. 
124  Johnston v. Ireland, no 9697/82, 1986.  
125  This was expressly noted by the court in X, Y and Z v. UK (above n. 118) para. 43. This is also 
obvious from a number of subsequent cases where the same reasoning was followed. See, for 
instance, Kroon v. The Netherlands, App. No. 18535/91, 1994. For an analysis of the principles 
established in ECtHR case-law relating to the de facto family see C. O’Mahony, ‘Irreconcilable 
Differences? Article 8 ECHR and Irish Law on Non-Traditional Families’ (2012) 26 International 
Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 31, 34-37. 
126  See the ECtHR’s more restrictive approach in a case which did not involve a ‘traditional’ 
(heterosexual) family but a family where the link that was sought to be established was between 
a trans (non-biological) parent and his child - see X, Y and Z v. UK (above n. 118). 
127  Wagner v. Luxembourg, no. 76240/01, 2007. 
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mind that the best interests of the child are paramount in such a case … the Court 
considers that the Luxembourg courts could not reasonably disregard the legal status 
validly created abroad and corresponding to a family life within the meaning of Article 
8 of the Convention.’128  
 
The case, therefore, demonstrates that Article 8 ECHR requires the contracting States 
to pursue the cross-border continuity of family ties. In other words, the ECHR 
signatory States are required by this provision to legally recognise family ties which 
have been lawfully established in another country. As noted by another commentator, 
the right to respect for private and family life, therefore, requires that ‘“limping” 
situations – i.e. situations where a personal status is recognized under the law of State 
X but not under the law of State Y – should be avoided to the largest possible 
extent’.129  
 
This principle can, clearly, prove very helpful for rainbow families who move between 
EU Member States in exercise of their EU free movement rights: the children of such 
families can rely on the Wagner ruling in order to claim that the host Member State is 
in breach of their right to family life (as is protected under Article 7 EUCFR and as a 
general principle of EU law) as a result of refusing to pursue the cross-border 
continuity of their family ties. What is more, such a reading of the right to family life 
seems to be in line with ECJ pronouncements where the Court emphasised the 
importance of ensuring that Union citizens who move can continue to lead a normal 
family life in the host Member State.130   
 
More recently, the ECtHR was called to rule in a case which involved the cross-border 
recognition of a parent-child relationship lawfully established abroad, albeit in the 
more controversial context of a surrogacy arrangement (Mennesson v. France).131 The 
ECtHR, following the principles established in Wagner v. Luxembourg, found that the 
contested refusal of France to recognise a surrogacy agreement entered into abroad, 
and the resultant refusal to legally recognise the parent-child relationship as 
established by this agreement,  amounted to a breach of Article 8 ECHR. However, 
unlike in Wagner, in this case, the ECtHR found that there was a breach of Article 8 
ECHR as regards the children’s right to private life only. In particular, the Court found 
that, on the facts of the case, the lack of recognition of the parent-child relationship 
did not disproportionally affect the applicants’ ability to enjoy their family life in a 
                                                 
128  Ibid., para. 133. See, also, Negrepontis-Giannisis v. Greece, no. 56759/09, 2011, which involved 
the cross-border legal recognition of an adoption lawfully concluded in another country (the 
US), albeit of an adult. 
129  P. Franzina, ‘Some remarks on the relevance of Article 8 of the ECHR to the recognition of family 
status judicially created abroad’ (2011) 3 Diritti umani e diritto internazionale 609, 611. 
130  See, inter alia, Metock (above n. 91) para. 62. In two more recent cases the Court, in particular, 
noted that ‘[t]he rights which nationals of Member States enjoy’ under Article 21(1) TFEU 
‘include the right to lead a normal family life, together with their family members, both in the 
host Member State and in the Member State of which they are nationals when they return to 
that Member State.’ – Coman (above n. 39) para. 32 and Case C-165/16 Lounes EU:C:2017:862, 
para. 52. For a similar argument see H. Toner (above n. 101) 307-308. 
131  Mennesson v. France, no. 65192/11, 2014. See, also, Labassee v. France, no. 65941/11, 2014 and 
Laborie v. France, no. 44024/13, 2017.  
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practical sense, and, thus, did not amount to a breach of their right to family life. There 
was, nonetheless, a breach of the right to private life of the children, since ‘respect for 
private life requires that everyone should be able to establish details of their identity 
as individual human beings, which includes the legal parent-child relationship’;132 the 
‘legal uncertainty’ caused as a result of the non-recognition in the host State is liable 
to have negative repercussions on the children’s definition of their personal identity. 
  
The case involved surrogacy which, as noted earlier in this article, is still largely 
prohibited within Europe, and this is so both for same-sex and opposite-sex couples. 
This may, in fact, be the reason behind the possible limitation of the effect of the ruling 
to situations involving the relationship between the children which have been born as 
a result of a surrogacy arrangement, on the one hand, and their intended biological 
parent, on the other. In particular, in the Mennesson case, one of the intended parents 
of the children (the father) was, also, their biological parent and the ECtHR in its ruling 
noted this ‘special dimension’ of the case and that ‘it cannot be said to be in the 
interests of the child to deprive him or her of a legal relationship of this nature where 
the biological reality of that relationship has been established and the child and parent 
concerned demand(ed) full recognition thereof … by thus preventing both the 
recognition and establishment under domestic law of their legal relationship with their 
biological father, the respondent State overstepped the permissible limits of its 
margin of appreciation’.133 This has caused one commentator to wonder whether the 
result in Mennesson would ‘have been the same in a case where none of the intended 
parents was the biological parent’ and whether ‘the obligation of recognition exist[s] 
regarding the biological father only or also the intended mother’.134 If this is, indeed, 
the case, it would mean that, when it comes to parent-child relationships established 
through surrogacy agreements, Article 8 ECHR merely requires signatory States to 
legally recognise the relationship between a child born through such an arrangement 
and his/her biological parent. This is, nonetheless, a point which awaits further 
clarification from the ECtHR.135 
 
                                                 
132  Mennesson v. France (above n. 131), para. 96. 
133  Emphasis added. 
134  I. Rein-Lescastereyres (above n. 21) 128. In the subsequent case of Foulon and Bouvet v. France, 
no. 9063/14 and 10410/14, 2016 the Court followed the same approach in a case which involved 
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the intended parents of a child born in Russia as a result of a surrogacy arrangement were not 
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135  G. Cano Palomares, ‘Right to family life and access to medically assisted procreation in the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights’ in M. González Pascual and A. Torres Pérez (eds), 
The Right to Family Life in the European Union (Routledge, 2017) 108. 
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Hence, the ECtHR has made it clear in a number of judgments that Article 8 ECHR is 
breached where there is de facto family life, and familial ties which have been legally 
established in another State are severed in the country of residence of the family. In 
particular, Article 8 ECHR requires signatory States to provide a legal framework for 
enabling the biological parent of a child to be recognised as the legal parent of the 
child and for the child to be integrated into that person’s family of origin (Marckx). In 
addition, the same provision requires signatory States to recognise the parent-child 
relationship – as this has been legally established in another country – between a child 
and his adoptive parent(s) (Wagner). The waters are somewhat muddier, nonetheless, 
when it comes to the cross-border legal recognition of a parent-child relationship 
established through a surrogacy agreement, as there are indications in the case-law 
that there is an obligation to recognise a parent-child relationship in such a context 
merely between a child and his/her (intended) biological parent (Mennesson).   
 
Although the relevant cases did not involve rainbow families, nor did they involve 
movement between EU Member States, similar legal argumentation can be pursued 
in situations involving the cross-border legal recognition of the legal status attached 
to the members of a rainbow family which moves between EU Member States.136  
 
Therefore, and transposing this interpretation of Article 8 ECHR into the EU context, 
the failure of the host Member State to legally recognise the familial ties between a 
child of a rainbow family and one or both of his/her parents, as these have been legally 
established elsewhere, can amount to an interference with the child’s rights to private 
and family life, protected as a general principle of EU law and under Article 7 EUCFR. 
This is, clearly, the case in all instances where the host Member State refuses to 
recognise the relationship between the child and his/her biological parent. As regards 
the non-biological parent, an interference with the rights to private and family life will 
emerge in situations where the child has been adopted, but it is unclear whether this 
is the case where the rainbow family has resorted to assisted procreation techniques 
or surrogacy. In any event, even if the ECtHR deems it necessary to limit its rulings in 
the above way, the EU institutions (including the ECJ, if the case which involves the 
issue is referred to it) may decide to grant more extensive protection. This is the case 
especially if the right to private and family life is read in the light of Article 33 EUCFR, 
                                                 
136  Nonetheless, it should be noted that that ECtHR may in fact adopt a different approach to the 
interpretation of the above provisions and, in particular, when examining whether a measure is 
justified, in situations where rainbow families are involved. As noted by another commentator, 
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which provides that ‘[t]he family shall enjoy legal, economic and social protection’. 
From the moment that a rainbow family is recognised as enjoying ‘family life’ and is, 
thus, ‘a family’, then it attracts, also, ‘legal protection’ under EU law; this can clearly 
be translated into an obligation imposed by EU law on Member States to ensure the 
cross-border continuity of the legal ties among the members of the family, wherever 
they move within the EU, without imposing any biological limitations.  
 
Nonetheless, the right to private and family life is not an absolute right and States are 
allowed to justify their measures which interfere with its exercise. And – as clarified 
by the Explanations attached to the Charter which were given interpretative effect by 
Article 6(1) TEU and Article 52(7) EUCFR137 – the limitations that can legitimately be 
imposed on this right by Article 7 EUCFR are the same as those allowed under Article 
8 ECHR. This means that the interference must have been conducted ‘in accordance 
with the law’, must further a legitimate aim of those mentioned in Article 8(2) ECHR, 
and must be necessary in a democratic society. Of course, in line with Article 52(3) 
EUCFR, the interpretation of these limitations can be narrower – and, thus, afford 
more extensive protection to the right itself – when applied for the purposes of Article 
7 EUCFR.  
 
Given that it is fairly clear and foreseeable that Member States who do not recognise 
rainbow families, will do so also in situations which involve rainbow families that come 
from other Member States, the interference can be considered to be in accordance 
with the law.  
 
However, can the contested refusal be justified by the ‘legitimate aims’ laid down in 
Article 8 ECHR? Member States would most likely argue that their refusal to legally 
recognise the family ties among the members of rainbow families coming from other 
Member States has two aims, i.e. the ‘protection of morals’ – with the specific aim of 
supporting and encouraging the family in the traditional sense which ‘is, in principle, 
a weighty and legitimate reason’138 – as well as ‘the protection of the rights of others’ 
(in this case, ‘others’ being read as referring to ‘children’).  
 
The aim of supporting and encouraging the traditional family has been recognised as 
a valid objective by the ECtHR,139 and, thus, can, also, form a possible justification, 
when examining the issue from the point of view of EU law. However, such a 
justification would most likely fail, because – to use the reasoning employed in Marckx 
v. Belgium – ‘in the achievement of this end recourse must not be had to measures 
whose object or result is … to prejudice the’ rainbow family, given that the members 
of the rainbow family can – as established in Gas and Dubois v. France – enjoy family 
life. Accordingly, the members of rainbow families who enjoy family life must ‘enjoy 
the guarantees of Article 8 on an equal footing with the members of the traditional 
                                                 
137  Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (above n. 84), Explanation on Article 
52. 
138  Karner, no. 40016/98, 2003, para. 40. 
139  See for instance Ibid and Vallianatos (above n. 75) para. 83.   
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family’. 140  Moreover, as another commentator has rightly argued, ‘The standard 
“traditional family” defence would suggest that, by reducing non-heterosexual family 
rights to the greatest extent possible, national laws disincentivize non-traditional 
family structures, prioritize heterosexual marriage relationships, and encourage 
individuals into a socially optimal family model. However … such an argument would 
be intellectually weak (not to mention wholly removed from social reality). Severing 
the legal connection between gay, lesbian, and bisexual parents and their non-
biological children does not persuade such individuals to enter an opposite-gender 
heterosexual marriage … instead of reinforcing the de facto social superiority of 
traditional families, the absence of LGB family rights has no appreciable impact on 
heterosexual marriage, but significantly impedes lesbian, gay, and bisexual family 
life’.141  
 
In any event, even if the above aim could, prima facie, justify the interference with the 
rights to private and family life in this context, it is unlikely to be found proportionate. 
The ECtHR has noted that ‘the fact that an essential aspect of the identity of 
individuals is at stake where the legal parent-child relationship is concerned’ means 
that the margin of appreciation afforded to States needs to be reduced.142 And, as the 
same court has noted,143 in cases where the margin of appreciation afforded to States 
is narrow ‘the principle of proportionality does not merely require that the measure 
chosen is in principle suited for realising the aim sought. It must also be shown that it 
was necessary in order to achieve that aim to exclude certain categories of people’ 
from a certain entitlement. For the reasons explained above, it cannot be shown that 
it is necessary, in order to protect the family in the traditional sense, to deprive the 
children of rainbow families of the entitlement to have their relationship with both 
parents – as established elsewhere – legally recognised in the Member State to which 
they move.  
 
                                                 
140  Marckx v. Belgium (above n. 31) para. 40. 
141  P. Dunne (above n. 27) 48-49. See, also, J. M. Scherpe, ‘The Legal Recognition of Same-Sex 
Couples in Europe and the Role of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2013) 10 The Equal 
Rights Review 83, 92; and N. D. Polikoff, ‘This Child does have two mothers: Redefining 
parenthood to meet the needs of children in lesbian-mother and other non-traditional families’ 
(1990) 78 Georgetown Law Journal 459, 486 
142  See, for instance, Mennesson v. France (above n. 131) paras 77 and 80; Oliari v. Italy (above n. 
75) paras 162-177; Orlandi, no. 26431/12, 26742/12, 44057/12, 60088/12, 2017, para. 203. In 
all these cases, the ECtHR noted that when there is ‘no consensus within the Member States of 
the Council of Europe, either as to the relative importance of the interest at stake or as to the 
best means of protecting it, particularly where the case raises sensitive moral or ethical issues, 
the margin will be wider’, however, it also went on to point out that ‘where a particularly 
important facet of an individual’s existence or identity is at stake the margin allowed to the State 
will be restricted’. As noted by Johnson (above n. 135) the notions of the margin of appreciation 
and the European consensus are used inconsistently by the ECtHR and, thus, it is difficult to 
predict how the analysis will be conducted on the facts of a particular case. In all the above 
cases, nonetheless, the ECtHR appeared to leave a narrow margin of appreciation to the 
signatory states even though there was not a clear European consensus with regards to the 
relevant matters.  
143  Karner (above n. 138) para. 41.  
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For similar reasons, a justification based on the need to protect the rights of others, 
namely the rights of the children of rainbow families, would also be bound to fail. It is 
well-known that the main argument of opponents of the legal recognition of same-
sex relationships and of parenting by same-sex couples, is the need to protect 
children. This argument is, mainly, symbolic as same-sex couples and rainbow families 
will continue to exist, irrespective of whether they are legally recognised. In fact, 
increasing numbers of children in Europe are being raised in families comprised of a 
same-sex couple and it is clear that failing to provide legal recognition to such families 
will not reduce the numbers of such families but will complicate their lives and will 
result in a breach of a number of fundamental rights that the children enjoy. As 
Koppelman has rightly pointed out, ‘[i]t would be bizarre and ironic for a state to harm 
actual children in order to make a symbolic point. The legal ties between parents and 
children should not be affected by any family member’s decision to cross state 
lines’.144 
 
There has been considerable social, scientific, and psychological research which 
argues that the successful raising of a child is not dependent upon the sexual 
orientation of his or her parents.145 Moreover, the ECtHR has pointed out in its case-
law that ‘there is currently a broad consensus – including in international law – in 
support of the idea that in all decisions concerning children, their best interests must 
be paramount’ and has made a reference to Article 24 EUCFR and to the importance 
of the right of the child to maintain a personal relationship and direct contact with 
both his/her parents.146 The same court has also noted that ‘family ties may only be 
severed in very exceptional circumstances and that everything must be done to 
preserve personal relations’.147 Accordingly, the best interests of the child seem to 
require that the familial ties (s)he has legally established with his/her parents in 
another country, should be maintained when the family moves to another Member 
State. Same-sex couples should, therefore, continue to be legally recognised as the 
joint parents of their children in the host State, not despite the children’s best 
                                                 
144  A. Koppelman (above n. 30) 110. See, also, pp. 150-151. 
145  See, most fundamentally, S. Golombok (above n. 8) esp. chapters 2 and 7; paras 47-52 of the 
Explanatory Memorandum by Mr Jonas Gunnarsson included in Report ‘Private and family life: 
achieving equality regardless of sexual orientation’ (Doc. 14620), drafted on 21 September 2018. 
The Report led to the adoption, by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), 
of Resolution 2239 (2018) ‘Private and family life: achieving equality regardless of sexual 
orientation’, adopted by PACE on 10 October 2018 (both documents are available online 
<http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-DocDetails-EN.asp?FileID=25166&lang=EN> 
(accessed on 19.12.2018); the sources referred to in this website 
<https://whatweknow.inequality.cornell.edu/topics/lgbt-equality/what-does-the-scholarly-
research-say-about-the-wellbeing-of-children-with-gay-or-lesbian-parents/> (accessed on 
25.06.2018); the American Psychological Association Policy Statement on Sexual Orientation, 
Parents, and Children < http://www.apa.org/about/policy/parenting.aspx> (2004) (accessed on 
25.06.2018); N. Gartrell, H. Bos, A. Koh, ‘National Longitudinal Lesbian Family Study – Mental 
Health of Adult Offspring’ (2018) 379 The New England Journal of Medicine 297. For a different 
view see para. 42 of the ECtHR judgment in Fretté v. France, no. 36515/97, 26/5/2002, 2002, 
though it should be noted that the case was decided more than 15 years ago. 
146  Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland, no. 41615/07, 2010, para. 135. 
147  ibid, para. 136. 
 38 
interests, but exactly because this is required, if the children’s best interests are taken 
into account.148  
 
In fact, the need to take into account the best interests of the child, can – under EU 
law – also be used as an independent argument by rainbow families seeking to have 
the parent-child relationship recognised when they move, since, unlike the ECHR, the 
Charter does contain a provision – Article 24 EUCFR – which specifically provides that 
in all actions relating to children their best interests must be a primary consideration. 
Accordingly, in the EU context, the best interests of the child argument does not need 
to be solely used as a shield, in order to prevent Member States from justifying their 
refusal to recognise rainbow families but it can, also, be used as a sword, when arguing 
that non-recognition amounts to a breach of EU law. Nonetheless, given the 
vagueness of the principle, which makes it vulnerable to be (ab)used by judges so as 
to disadvantage the children of rainbow families,149 it might be better for rainbow 
families to base their argument on the right to private and family life and – as will be 
seen in the next subsection – the prohibition of discrimination on the ground of sexual 
orientation. 
 
Accordingly, taking into account the ECtHR’s interpretation of the right to private and 
family life, we can argue that the failure of the host EU Member State to recognise the 
legal links between the child in a rainbow family and both of his parents – as these 
have been legally established elsewhere – can clearly amount to an unjustified breach 
of the right to private and family life of the child, as this is laid down under Article 7 
EUCFR and the general principles of EU law.150  
 
 
V.3.2.  Breach of the Prohibition of Discrimination on the Ground of Sexual 
Orientation  
 
In situations where the host Member State refuses to recognise the parental ties 
between a child of a same-sex couple and both of his/her parents, as these have been 
legally established elsewhere, this is clearly done because the parents of the child are 
of the same sex. In other words, Member States which do not allow a same-sex couple 
to legally establish a family in their territory, and which do not allow a rainbow family 
lawfully established elsewhere to be recognised as such, do so for the simple reason 
                                                 
148  C. McGlynn (above n. 10) 108. For a clear statement by the ECJ that when Member States apply 
and/or implement EU secondary legislation, Article 24 EUCFR read together with Article 51 
requires them in all its decisions to have the child’s best interests as their primary consideration 
see Case C-648/11 MA and others EU:C:2013:367, paras 57-59.  
149  As another commentator has noted, ‘the vagueness of the principle [of the best interests of the 
child] means it can just as easily be used as a “fulcrum for regression” as it can for progression’ 
– M. Woolf, ‘Coming of age? – the principle of “the best interests of the child” (2003) 2 European 
Human Rights Law Review 205, 208. For a criticism of the principle of the best interests of the 
child when applied in situations involving parenting by same-sex couples see I. Isailovic, 
‘Children’s rights and LGBTI persons’ rights: few thoughts on their “integration”’ in E. Brems, E. 
Desmet and W. Vandenhole (eds), Children’s Rights Law in the Global Human Rights Landscape: 
Isolation, Inspiration, Integration? (Routledge, 2017) 198-201.  
150  For a similar argument see P. Dunne (above n. 27) 43-44. 
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that the couple that is founding the family is comprised of two persons of the same 
sex. If the parents of the child were an opposite-sex couple, in the vast majority of 
cases they would both be legally recognised as the parents of the child, even if the 
child was adopted or was conceived via assisted procreation methods. Accordingly, 
the children of same-sex couples are expressly treated worse than the children of 
opposite-sex couples and, thus, there is discrimination which is directly based on the 
fact that the parents of the children who are treated worse are a same-sex couple. 
 
As Robert Wintemute noted in his expert testimony in the Atala Riffo case before the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, ‘sexual orientation also includes conduct. This 
means that protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation is not only 
about less favourable treatment for being lesbian or gay. It also covers discrimination 
because an individual acts on their sexual orientation, by choosing to engage in 
consensual sexual activity in private, or to enter into a long-term couple relationship 
with a partner of the same sex’. 151  Accordingly, discrimination against rainbow 
families is discrimination based on the fact that the LGB parents in a rainbow family 
have acted on their sexual orientation by entering into a long-term couple relationship 
with a partner of the same sex and is, thus, a form of discrimination on the ground of 
sexual orientation. 
 
Hence, the children of same-sex couples face discrimination because of the sexual 
orientation of their parents and, in particular, they face discrimination on the ground 
of sexual orientation by association with their LGB parents. As established by the ECJ 
in the Coleman case,152 the prohibition of discrimination under Directive 2000/78153 – 
the EU instrument which prohibits discrimination on, inter alia, the ground of sexual 
orientation in the context of employment – includes, also, discrimination by 
association. There is no reason why this should not, also, be the case for Article 21 
EUCFR, which, generally, prohibits discrimination on, inter alia, the ground of sexual 
orientation.154   
 
Unlike Article 14 ECHR, which is not a free standing provision and, thus, requires the 
discrimination complained of to be experienced with regards to the enjoyment of one 
of the rights provided by the ECHR,155 Article 21 EUCFR is a free standing provision 
and, thus, for its breach it suffices that an EU institution or a Member State – when 
implementing EU law – discriminates on the ground of, inter alia, sexual orientation. 
Moreover, Article 20 EUCFR provides that ‘Everyone is equal before the law’ and 
                                                 
151  Expert testimony rendered by expert Robert Wintemute, September 16, 2011. Quoted by the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Case of Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile Inter-Am. 
Comm. HR, Case 12.502, para. 134. 
152  Case C-303/06, Coleman EU:C:2008:415. 
153  Above n. 97. 
154  There has not been a case to date which precedes the recognition of the EUCFR as a legally 
binding document and which involved the need to establish whether the prohibition of 
discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation is a fundamental human right protected as a 
general principle of EU law. 
155  Protocol 12 of the ECHR is a free-standing provision prohibiting discrimination on a number of 
grounds, however, it has only been ratified by a minority of ECHR signatory states.  
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McGlynn has noted that this can be read as, inter alia, requiring that ‘All children are 
equal before the law’.156 Despite the fact that both of the above provisions provide 
for self-standing rights to equality and non-discrimination, they can, of course, be read 
together with one or more of the other rights laid down in the Charter. For instance, 
in situations where the family cannot move together in the territory of another 
Member State due to the refusal to recognise legally the ties between a child and one 
of his/her parents, there is discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation as 
regards the enjoyment of the right to family life. As noted by the ECtHR, ‘the mutual 
enjoyment by parent and child of each other’s company constitutes a fundamental 
element of family life’ and ‘domestic measures hindering such enjoyment amount to 
an interference with the right protected by Article 8’ of ECHR. 157  Accordingly, in 
situations where a rainbow family is not allowed to move together in the territory of 
another Member State in circumstances where a similarly situated family comprised 
of an opposite-sex couple would, there is discrimination on the ground of sexual 
orientation as regards the right to family life.158 As another commentator has rightly 
noted, ‘one should wonder whether, even if the State does not recognize same-sex 
marriage or unions, there appears any reason why the child should be deprived of one 
parent just because the couple is formed by two people of the same gender’.159  
 
Irrespective of which line of argument will be pursued – whether the prohibition of 
discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation is employed alone or with another 
fundamental human right – the important question is whether the host Member State 
may, nonetheless, be justified in drawing a distinction between the children of 
rainbow families and the children of opposite-sex couples, in situations where there 
has been an exercise of EU free movement rights.  
 
The ECtHR has made it clear that it considers discrimination based on sexual 
orientation to be as serious as discrimination on the grounds of ‘race, origin or 
colour’,160 and it has also repeatedly held that ‘differences based on sexual orientation 
require particularly serious reasons by way of justification’.161 This means that where 
a difference in treatment is based on sexual orientation, the State’s margin of 
appreciation is narrow and this strict test will rarely – if ever – be satisfied. 
 
The Member States would – most probably – rely on the same arguments as they 
would, when justifying an interference of the rights to private and family life: the need 
to protect and encourage the traditional family and the need to protect the rights of 
                                                 
156  C. McGlynn (above n. 10) 71. 
157  Schalk and Kopf (above n. 75) para. 91. 
158  In such situations, it would be unlikely to find a breach of the right to family life alone, as it is 
well-established that States are not under an obligation under Article 8 ECHR to authorise a 
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159  M. M. Winkler (above n. 12) 
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161  Gas and Dubois (above n. 7) para. 59; Smith and Grady v. UK, nos 33985/96 and 33986/96, 2000, 
para. 90; Karner v. Austria (above n. 137) para. 37; Vallianatos v. Greece (above n. 75) para. 77; 
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 41 
the children. The arguments made in the previous sub-section for rejecting these aims 
as sufficient justifications are, naturally, applicable in this context as well, and, 
therefore, will not be repeated here. When examining this discrimination argument, 
the injustice suffered by the children of rainbow families becomes even more obvious, 
as they are directly compared with the children of parents who are not in a same-sex 
relationship. As Judge Villiger very rightly noted in his dissenting opinion in the Gas 
and Dubois v. France case, ‘how can children help it that they were born of a parent 
of a same-sex couple rather than of a parent of a heterosexual couple? Why should 
the child have to suffer for the parents’ situation?’. 162  Or, as asked by another 
commentator, ‘Why prejudice children living in a certain kind of relationship’?163  
 
Accordingly, the children of rainbow families should not be ‘penalised in [their] daily 
existence’ 164  simply because of their association with their parents who are of 
homosexual sexual orientation. Penalising the children of same-sex couples is an 
ineffectual way of deterring same-sex couples from having a family, as the desire to 
have a child – in same-sex couples which have such a desire – is very strong, as can be 
gathered from the fact that having a child together is not naturally possible and, thus, 
the couple often has to undergo through cumbersome and costly procedures. Hence, 
same-sex couples are unlikely to be discouraged from having a family as a result of the 
legal difficulties that they will face,165 and, thus, Member State policies that harm 
children for the sake of regulating the sexual behaviour of their parents should be 
condemned. 
 
Just as the children of opposite-sex couples that move to the host Member State in 
exercise of their free movement rights, have the right to benefit from family 
reunification rights granted by EU law and, once admitted, to be recognised as the 
children of both of their parents, in the same way, the children of same-sex couples 
that move to another Member State should be able to maintain the legal ties lawfully 
established between them and their parents elsewhere and to enjoy the rights that 




                                                 
162  Dissenting opinion of Judge Villiger in Gas and Dubois v. France (above n. 7). 
163  K. Lundström, ‘Family Life and the Freedom of Movement of Workers in the European Union’ 
(1996) 10 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family, 250, 262. 
164  Wagner v. Luxembourg (above n. 127) para. 158. 
165  For a similar argument in the US context see L. Gonzalez (above n. 10) 307-308. 
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(homosexual) sexual orientation – as established in E.B. v. France (above n. 76) – it would seem 
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V.3.3.  Breach of Rights Protected Under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) is a human rights Treaty adopted by 
the UN General Assembly in 1989. It entered into force in 1990 and, since then, has 
received near-global ratification. It sets out the civil, political, economic, social, health 
and cultural rights of children, ‘child’ being defined in its Article 1 as ‘every human 
being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, 
majority is attained earlier’. There is no court which oversees compliance with the 
Convention, but, rather, the Committee on the Rights of the Child which is a body of 
eighteen independent experts, monitors and reports on the progress made by states 
parties.167   
 
All EU Member States have signed and ratified the CRC and are, thus, bound by it as a 
matter of international law. Moreover, although the EU is not party to it, the ECJ has 
pointed out that it ‘has already recognised that the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child is binding on each of the Member States and is one of the international 
instruments for the protection of fundamental rights of which it takes account in 
applying the general principles of Community law’.168 
 
Accordingly, the rights laid down in the CRC – and the interpretation of those rights 
by the Committee on the Rights of the Child – can, clearly, be relied on to strengthen 
the position of the children of rainbow families, in situations where the host Member 
State legally severs the familial ties between them and (one or both of) their 
parents. 169  In particular, the Convention can be used as a source of valuable 
interpretive guidance by the ECJ and the other EU institutions when determining the 
interpretation of the rights that rainbow families derive from EU law. 
 
The CRC, obviously, provides some of the rights that children already enjoy under EU 
law, such as, the right to private and family life (Article 16 CRC) and the best interests 
of the child (Article 3 CRC). 170 However, it also includes a number of other rights (or 
more detailed rights) which can, clearly, bolster the argument of rainbow families who 
seek cross-border legal recognition when they exercise their EU free movement rights. 
 
                                                 
167  For a more detailed analysis of the CRC see T. Buck, International Child Law (Palgrave, 2014) 
Chapter 3. 
168  Case C-244/06 Dynamic Medien EU:C:2007:515, para. 90. For a summary of the role of the CRC 
in the development of the EU’s child policy see EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, ‘Handbook 
on European law relating to the rights of the child’, 
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(accessed on 11.01.2019). 
169  N. Kogovšek Šalamon, White Paper ‘Rights on the Move – Rainbow Families in Europe’, The 
Peace Institute (01.01.2015) <http://www.mirovni-institut.si/en/publications/white-paper-
rights-on-the-move-rainbow-families-in-europe/> (accessed on 17.01.2019) page 28. 
170  Guidance on the interpretation of the principle of the best interests of the child has been 
provided by the Committee on the Rights of the Child in its General comment No. 14 (2013) on 
the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration (art. 3, 
para 1), 29 May 2013. 
 43 
Article 2(2) CRC contains one of the foundational principles of the Convention (non-
discrimination) and provides that ‘States Parties shall take all appropriate measures 
to ensure that the child is protected against all forms of discrimination or punishment 
on the basis of the status, activities, expressed opinions, or beliefs of the child’s 
parents, legal guardians, or family members’. Although the above list of grounds does 
not include sexual orientation, the Committee on the Rights of the Child has confirmed 
in one of its (recent) General Comments that children are entitled to the enjoyment 
of their rights ‘regardless of the children’s or their parents’ … sexual orientation’,171 
whilst, in another General Comment, it recognised that children may ‘suffer the 
consequences of discrimination against their parents, for example if children have 
been born out of wedlock or in other circumstances that deviate from traditional 
values’.172 Accordingly, this can strengthen the argument of the children of rainbow 
families that they must not be discriminated against because of the sexual orientation 
of their parents, in situations where the family exercises EU free movement rights. 
 
The same argument can, also, be bolstered by Article 8(1) CRC which protects the right 
to identity and provides that ‘States Parties undertake to respect the right of the child 
to preserve his or her identity, including nationality, name and family relations as 
recognized by law without unlawful interference’. Of course, the question here is 
whether ‘family relations’ do – for the purposes of the CRC – include relations among 
the members of a rainbow family. The approach of the Committee on the Rights of 
the Child towards the notion of the ‘family’ seems to be flexible enough to include 
rainbow families, despite the fact that this has not been explicitly acknowledged, 
possibly due to the fact that the CRC has been ratified by a very large number of 
countries around the world, some of which are deeply homophobic, and, thus, an 
explicit statement to this effect might give rise to an overly negative reaction on their 
part. When interpreting this provision, the Committee noted that ‘[t]he basic 
institution in society for the survival, protection and development of the child is the 
family. When considering the family environment the Convention reflects different 
family structures arising from the various cultural patterns and emerging familial 
relationships. In this regard the Convention refers to the extended family and the 
community and applies to situations of nuclear family, separated parents, single 
parent family, common law family and adoptive family’.173 Reflecting on this, one 
commentator has noted that the above passage ‘does not restrict the definition of 
“parents” to heterosexual couples. Although there is no reference to people of the 
same sex, there is also no express exclusion of such relationships. …. [T]here is nothing 
                                                 
171  Joint general comment No. 3 (2017) of the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of all 
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in the final text of article 8 which demands that the meaning of “familial relations” be 
restricted to biological ties’.174  
 
Finally, Article 9(1) CRC provides that ‘States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not 
be separated from his or her parents against their will, except when competent 
authorities subject to judicial review determine, in accordance with applicable law and 
procedures, that such separation is necessary for the best interests of the child’.175 
This provision – especially when read together with Article 2(1) CRC – can help to 
strengthen the argument of the children of rainbow families that they should not be 
discriminated against on the ground of the sexual orientation of their parents when 




VI  Conclusion 
 
Despite the fact that same-sex couples have often succeeded in creating and 
sustaining meaningful family relationships, in some EU Member States the law does 
not recognise relationships between same-sex partners, nor does it protect 
relationships between same-sex couples and their children. As has been explained in 
this article, EU law cannot require those Member States to make provision in their 
laws for rainbow families to be legally established as families in their territory, as this 
is a matter that falls squarely within the regulatory purview of the Member States. 
Nonetheless, families which are recognised as families under one legal system, cannot 
have their status as a family and the rights attached to that status, challenged or 
ignored in the EU Member State to which they move. This creates gross 
inconsistencies across State lines and great uncertainties for rainbow families. In 
addition, it gives rise to a breach of the EU free movement rights to which Union 
citizens are entitled, as well as to fundamental human rights which are protected 
under EU law. 
 
A court or legislature cannot stop gays or lesbians from forming families. The law’s 
unwillingness to legally recognise and preserve parent-child relationships in rainbow 
families that move across borders comes contrary to the best interests of the children 
of such families and breaches a number of fundamental rights they enjoy under EU 
law. It is, therefore, necessary for EU judges and/or the EU legislature to fashion rules 
and principles that reflect the reality of the lives of the children of rainbow families, 
when such families move between EU Member States. The difficulty with this is that 
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in order for EU legislation to pass, it needs to have, at least,176 the support of the 
majority of EU Member States in the Council. And given that it is only in a minority of 
EU Member States that there is currently full legal recognition of the parental rights 
of same-sex couples, it is highly unlikely that the necessary majority will be achieved.  
 
There is, therefore, a need for an alternative EU law response on the matter. In the 
absence of a reference for a preliminary ruling to the ECJ by a national court before 
which the issue is raised, a first step towards the right direction can come from the 
(other) EU institutions. In particular, the European Commission should take action 
under the Article 258 TFEU procedure against the defaulting EU Member States and, 
if they continue to breach the rights that the children of rainbow families enjoy under 
EU law, an action should be brought before the ECJ asking it to declare that their 
refusal to legally recognise the familial ties between a child and both of his (same-sex) 
parents when they move to their territory, amounts to a breach of EU law. In addition, 
the Commission should issue a Communication clarifying that the terms used in free 
movement case-law and secondary legislation which governs the right of families to 
move freely between Member States (e.g. ‘primary carer’, ‘direct descendants’, and 
‘ascendants in the direct line’) are inclusive of rainbow families.177 This will ensure that 
when rainbow families move between EU Member States, they will be treated in the 
same way as the families of opposite-sex couples, as regards the grant of family 
reunification rights as well as rights to which families are entitled after they are 
admitted into the host Member State: as long as the familial ties among a child and 
both of his/her parents are legally recognised in a country either within or outside the 
EU, they must continue to be recognised, also, when the family exercises EU free 
movement rights and the family must not be separated or deprived of various 
entitlements simply because the parental roles are played by persons of the same sex.  
 
Only in this way will the children’s need for continuity and stability be served and EU 
law will become an instrument for contesting the heteronormative morality prevailing 
in the majority of EU Member States. After all, the EU claims to be ‘founded on the 
values of’ inter alia respect for human dignity, equality, and respect for human rights, 
including the rights of persons belonging to minorities178 and this, clearly, cannot be 
read to mean that this is only human dignity, equality and human rights for some. 
Moreover, Article 10 TFEU provides that ‘In defining and implementing its policies and 
activities, the Union shall aim to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic 
origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation’.179 Children who live 
outside the traditional nuclear family should not be marginalised and excluded from 
many of the entitlements and rights they derive from EU law and they should not live 
                                                 
176  And, if a legal basis which requires unanimity (e.g. Article 19 TFEU or Article 81 TFEU) is used as 
the only or one of the legal bases for the legislation, then the proposal will need to be approved 
by all EU Member States. 
177  A similar step has recently been taken by the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly in paras 
2 and 4.5 of Resolution 2239 (2018) (above n. 145). See, also, paragraphs 6, 37 and 67 of the 
Explanatory memorandum by Mr Jonas Gunnarsson, rapporteur, attached to the Resolution 
(above n. 145).  
178  Article 2 TEU. 
179  Emphasis added. 
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in fear that if their family moves to another EU Member State their legal links with one 
or both of their parents will be severed. 
 
 
 
 
 
